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SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
VOLUME XII WINTER, 19 5 8 NUMBER 1
COMMUNITY PROPERTY AND FEDERAL TAXES t
by
John Paul Jackson*1
T HIS paper will deal with some of the federal tax problems
arising under our community property system. The discussion,
necessarily, will be limited in scope, and will touch upon some of
the more common problems encountered in the tax practice.' A
brief resume of the origin and nature of our community property
system may be helpful as a background.
1. THE CIVIL LAW ORIGIN OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY
The ancient community property marital system stems from the
civil and not the common law. The system is older than the com-
mon law It is accepted by a larger number of people and applies
to a larger territory than was ever true of the common law. The
system has found special favor with pioneering peoples where the
wife ordinarily joins the husband in all of his efforts to gain a live-
lihood.'
In the United States there are eight traditional community prop-
erty states-Texas, Louisiana, California, Washington, Arizona,
New Mexico, Idaho and Nevada. ' While the laws of these eight
states have the same basic concept of marital partnership, they do
have different histories and do vary in substantial detail. Thus, Lou-
*Attorney at Law, Dallas, Texas.
t This paper is a revision of an earlier paper, "Problems Relating to Community
Property," delivered in November 1955 at the Tax Institute of the University of Houston.
'The best modern text on community property generally is the two-volume work of
de Funiak, Principles of Community Property (1943). A valuable, though older, treatise
is McKay, Community Property (2d ed. 1925). The standard Texas text, though some-
what out of date, is Speer, Law of Marital Rights in Texas (1929). An excellent sum-
mary of the Texas law on the subject is the Commentary by W. 0. Huie, appearing in
the preface to volume 13, Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann.
2 It is said that the system had its origins in the laws of the Visigoths. After a victory
in battle, the women and men together gathered the spoils of victory and shared the
loot equally. In their conquest of Spain, they are supposed to have brought into the
Spanish Civil Law this concept of equal sharing between man and wife of the accumula-
tions of the marriage.
aDe Funiak, op. cit. supra note 1, at 10, 27.
4 In the 1940's several states adopted statutory community property systems in order
to give their citizens the benefit of split income tax returns. With the adoption of the
joint income tax return provisions in 1948, these states repealed their community laws,
but the eight original states continued theirs.
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isiana derived its system from the civil law of France and from
the Napoleonic Code; whereas, Texas derived its system from the
Spanish law via Mexico. As the new territories in the Southwest and
the Far West were opened up, lawyers of Anglo-Saxon origin, train-
ed in the English common law, pioneered into the frontier country.
As these territories assumed statehood, these lawyers had a consid-
erable hand in the writing of the constitutions and statutes of the
new states. Many of these pioneer lawyers, trained in eastern schools,
became judges and their early decisions materially affected the juris-
prudence of their particular state. The result was that much of
the common law has found its way, in varying degrees, into the
old civil systems,' and, by legislation and judicial decision, the laws
of the several community property states differ in important detail.
Thus, in California and Washington, income derived from sepa-
rate property is the separate income of the separate owner; whereas,
in Texas and Louisiana, such income is community. Likewise, the
New Mexico system is a hybrid and, perhaps, not a true community
property system at all. There, while at the husband's death the
wife has a vested half interest in the marital accumulations, she,
in event of her prior death, has no power of testamentary disposition
over her half of the community. In this important respect, the New
Mexico law differs from civil law and from the law of the other
community property states.
Because of differences in these state laws, this discussion will be
confined to the Texas law.
2. THE TEXAS COMMUNITY PROPERTY SYSTEM
As indicated above, Texas derived its community property laws
from Spain by way of Mexico. In Texas, the community system
was in force while Texas was a Spanish territory; while Texas was
a Mexican territory; while Texas was a republic; and constitutional
provisions were made therefor when Texas entered the Union.
The basic concept of the Spanish civil law was that upon marriage,
unless otherwise agreed,' man and wife became partners in all ac-
cumulations during marriage, each entitled to one-half of these
accumulations upon dissolution of the marriage by divorce or by
death of either partner. While the husband was the manager of
the community, he acted, not for himself alone, but for the spouses
'Louisiana has maintained the old civil law in its purest form.
' Today, in Mexico, the spouses, upon marriage, may elect to adopt the community
system or to preserve the concept of separate ownership of accumulations during mar-
riage. No such election is available in Texas.
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jointly. Theoretically, both partners contributed to the partnership
all of their time and efforts together with the use of their separate
capital. The separate capital consisted of property owned at marriage
and property acquired after marriage by inheritance or by gift.
On dissolution of the marriage, the separate capital of each was first
restored before a division of profits. If separate property of one
of the spouses was on hand when the partnership terminated, that
specific property was restored; but, generally, the rule was that
on dissolution there was a reimbursement to the separate contributor
of the value at the time of the marriage of the separate capital
contributed. However, if a specific item of separate property could
be traced into the acquisition of another property, the other prop-
erty became the separate property of the owner of the original sep-
arate property. If, for example, Blackacre, which was separate prop-
erty of the wife, were exchanged for Whiteacre, Whiteacre became
the separate property of the wife.'
These basic principles were carried into the Texas law, first by
the Texas laws of 1840 and then by the Constitution of 1845. The
first constitutional provision was continued in later constitutions
and now appears as article 16, section 15 of our present constitu-
tion. It provides that "All property, both real and personal of the
wife, owned or claimed by her before marriage, and that acquired
afterward by gift, devise or descent, shall be her separate property;
and laws shall be passed more clearly defining the rights of the wife,
in relation as well to her separate property as that held in common
with her husband."'
Statutes of Texas, first enacted in 1848, have contained similar
definitions of the separate property of both husband and wife. Ar-
ticle 4613 of the present revised civil statutes defines the husband's
separate property as being "All property of the husband, both real
and personal, owned or claimed by him before marriage, and that
acquired afterwards by gift, devise or descent, as also the increase
of all lands thus acquired. . . ." The section also gave the husband
during marriage ". . the sole management, control, and disposition
of his separate property. .. "
Article 4614 gives the same definition of the wife's separate
property and gives her like control over her separate property
except that it requires the joinder of the husband on the conveyance
7De Funiak, op. cit. supra note 1, pars. 63, 69; Huie, supra note 1, at VII-VII.
' It should be noted that while the Texas Constitution, in the main, adopted the com-
mon law of England as the basic law, it expressly discarded the common law's somewhat
barbaric treatment of the wife and her property following marriage.
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or encumbrance of her separate lands and on the transfer of her
separate stocks and bonds.9
Article 4619 provides that all property acquired by either hus-
band or wife during marriage, except that which is the separate
property of either, shall be deemed the common property of the
husband and wife; and all the effects which the husband and wife
possess at the time the marriage may be dissolved (e.g., by divorce
or death of either) shall be regarded as common effects or gains,
unless the contrary be satisfactorily proved. This article further
provides that during coverture, the common property shall be
managed by the husband."
Thus, by constitution and by statute, Texas adopted the basic
principles of the Spanish civil law's community property system.
As to all accumulations during marriage (except property received
by gift, devise, or inheritance), the spouses are equal partners."
Husband and wife each has a vested half interest in these accumu-
lations. While, in most instances, the husband has managerial con-
trol over the common property, his control is not absolute or, in
any way, the equivalent of ownership. He acts as if he were an
agent of the community or as if he were a trustee or as if he were
the managing partner of a limited partnership. If he acts in fraud of
the wife's rights, she is not without remedy in the courts." Her
2Important changes were made in articles 4614, 4616, 4617 and 4623, Tex. Rev. Civ.
Stat. Ann. (1951), by the 55th Legislature in the 1957 session laws in relation to the
wife's separate property. One of the more important of these changes is that a wife, if
21 years of age, may elect, by filing a statement in deed records of the county of her
residence, to have sole management, control and disposition of her separate property, in
which case joinder of her husband to the encumbrance or conveyance of her lands and
his joinder in transfer of her separate stock and bonds shall not be necessary. These
amendments are effective January 1, 1958. Vernon's Tex. Sess. Laws 1957, 55th Leg.,
Reg. Sess., at 1233-35.
' Certain exceptions are made. The wife has the management and control of com-
munity if the husband dies or becomes insane, Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 3678 (1952),
or if he should disappear and his whereabouts are unknown for twelve months. Tex. Rev.
Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 4619 (1951). Also, the wife has control over the revenues of her
separate property. Hawkins v. Britton State Bank, 122 Tex. 69, 52 S.W.2d 243 (1932).
In one of the earliest Texas cases, Cartwright v. Hollis, 5 Tex. 152, 163 (1849),
Chief Justice Hemphill said:
• . . and the obvious purpose of the statute was to preserve from the wreck of the
Spanish system of jurisprudence those rules, with some modifications, which regarded
the matrimonial union, so far as property was concerned, as a species of partner-
ship. ...
This has been the dominating theory of subsequent Texas decisions. Arnold v. Leonard,
114 Tex. 535, 273 S.W. 799 (1925); Stone v. Jackson, 109 Tex. 385, 210 S.W. 953
(1919); Moody v. Smoot, 78 Tex. 119, 14 S.W. 285 (1890); Leatherwood v. Arnold,
66 Tex. 414, 1 S.W. 173 (1886); Stramler v. Coe, 15 Tex. 211 (1855).
"Arnold v. Leonard, 114 Tex. 535, 273 S.W. 799 (1925); Martin v. McAllister, 94
Tex. 567, 63 S.W. 624 (1901); Stramler v. Coe, 15 Tex. 211 (1855); Coss v. Coss, 207
S.W. 127 (Tex. Civ. App. 1918); Watson v. Harris, 61 Tex. Civ. App. 263, 130 S.W. 237
(1910).
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rights, aside from managerial control, are equal to his. Thus, on
divorce, subject to equitable partition by the court, the community
property is divided equally." At his death, whatever his will may
provide, the wife takes half of the community.' At her prior death,
she may leave her half of the community to whomsoever she pleases,
even to a paramour."' If she dies without a will, her interest passes to
her children, even though their father be another man. Only if she
dies intestate and there be no children or lineal descendants does
the surviving husband inherit the decedent's share of the community.
3. TAX TREATMENT OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY IN GENERAL
The concept of the marital partnership and of the spouses being
equal owners of the marital accumulations is recognized under our
tax laws. Thus, upon the death of either spouse, an inheritance tax
is levied by the State of Texas only upon the half of the community
property which passes at that spouse's death.' In 1930 the United
States Supreme Court recognized that the interest of a wife in
community property in Texas is properly characterized as a present
vested interest, equal and equivalent to that of her husband; that
one-half of the community income is therefore income of the wife,
and consquently she and her husband are entitled to make separate
federal income tax returns, each of one-half of such income." Simi-
larly, the Treasury Department, supported by rulings of attorneys
general of the United States, held that, in those states in which
each spouse owned a present interest in community property, only
the half owned by the decedent spouse was includible in his gross
"3Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 4638 (1951); Hedtke v. Hedtke, 112 Tex. 404, 248
S.W. 21 (1923); Trimble v. Trimble, 15 Tex. 19 (1855); Fitts v. Fitts, 14 Tex. 443(1855); Helm v. Helm, 291 S.W. 648 (Tex. Civ. App. 1927); Jeter v. Jeter, 281 S.W.
598 (Tex. Civ. App. 1926); Hughes v. Hughes, 259 S.W. 180 (Tex. Civ. App. 1924);
Long v. Long, 29 Tex. Civ. App. 536, 69 S.W. 428 (1902). We have found no case
in which the wife, on divorce, was awarded less than one-half of the community property.
The husband's acts have been made the basis for awarding the wife more than one-half
of the community. Scannell v. Scannell, 117 S.W.2d 538 (Tex. Civ. App. 1938).
"aTex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. arts. 2578, 4619 (1951); Arnold v. Leonard, 114 Tex.
535, 273 S.W. 799 (1925); Wright v. Hays, 10 Tex. 130 (1853).
"5Tex. Rev. Civ. Star. Ann. art. 8281 (1956); Rogers v. Trevathan, 67 Tex. 406(1887); Moss v. Helsley, 60 Tex. 426 (1883); Brown v. Pridgen, 56 Tex. 124 (1882).
"aTex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. arts. 2578, 2582 (1951).
"rHensen v. Blackmon, 169 S.W.2d 955 (Tex. Civ. App. 1942), aff'd, 140 Tex. 536,
169 S.W.2d 962 (1943); Jones v. State, 5 S.W.2d 973 (Tex. Civ. App. 1928).
s Hopkins v. Bacon, 282 U.S. 122 (1930). Similar decisions were made respecting four
of the other community property states. Arizona, Goodell v. Koch, 282 U.S. 118 (1930);
California, United States v. Malcolm, 282 U.S. 792 (1931); Louisiana, Bender v. Pfaff,
282 U.S. 127 (1930); Washington, Poe v. Seaborn, 282 U.S. 101 (1930).
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estate for estate tax purposes.19 These rulings were consistently fol-
lowed by the federal taxing authorities and applied by the courts
up until 1942.:
In 1942, Congress adopted amendments to the estate and gift
tax laws directed specifically against the community property
states.21 Congress felt that citizens in the community property states
were enjoying preferential estate tax treatment since on the death
of the husband, only one-half of the community property was sub-
ject to estate tax." Seeking to remove this tax advantage, the amend-
ment taxed all community property to the first spouse to die ex-
cept such of it as was economically attributable to the survivor,
that is, except such as was traceable to or was "derived originally
from" either the personal earnings or the separate property of the
survivor. These amendments discriminated against the community
property states affected; it produced hardship in many cases and
created impossible burdens of tracing all transactions of a married
life in the futile effort to determine to what extent every item of
community property on hand at death was economically attrib-
utable to the survivor. These amendments were first attacked on
constitutional grounds but the United States Supreme Court held
that they were not unconstitutional," whereupon efforts were made
to repeal the amendments.
In 1948, Congress was prevailed upon to repeal (though not
retroactively) these unfortunate amendments. However, it did so
only because the repeal was accompanied by comprehensive changes
in the income, gift and estate tax laws which were designed to
equalize all these taxes as between the common law and the com-
munity property states. The so-called equalization bill was adopted
'
5 T.D. 2450, promulgated February 14, 1917; T.D. 3138, 4 Cum. Bull. 283 (1921);
T.D. 3670, IV-1 Cum. Bull. 19 (1925). It was pointed out by the Attorney General in
T.D. 3670:
If the widow takes by virtue of her ownership in community property which is
held by the community subject only to the power of disposition of the husband,
obviously the estate tax has no application. . . . [A] study of the true character
of that interest as it existed in the Spanish law, and as it has been developed in the
jurisprudence of the community property states . . . affords no substantial basis for
the hope that a renewal of the litigation on this subject in the Federal Courts would
change the result.
" Lang's Esate v. Commissioner, 304 U.S. 264 (1938); Commissioner v. Cadwallader,
127 F.2d $47 (9th Cir. 1942); United States v. Goodyear, 99 F.2d 523 (9th Cir. 1938);
Wardell v. Blum, 276 Fed. 226 (9th Cir. 1921), cert. denied, 258 U.S. 617 (1921);
Burkett Estate, 3 B.T.A. 1158 (1926); G.C.M. 7773, IX-2 Cum. Bull. 426 (1930).
"I nt. Rev. Code of 1939, § 811 (e), as amended, Revenue Act of 1942, 5 402(b).
22 H.R. Rep. No. 2333, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 35-37, 160 [1942-2 Cum. Bull. 401];
S. Rep. No. 1631, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. p. 231-32 [1942-2 Cum. Bull. 5041.
"'Wiener v. Fernandez, 326 U.S. 340 (1945) (La.).
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as a part of the Revenue Act of 1948,24 and these changes have
been carried forward into the Revenue Code of 1954.
Equalization was achieved in the income tax by the so-called
split return, under which married persons were permitted at their
election to combine their respective incomes on a single joint return.
The combined taxable income was divided by two, and an income
tax then computed on one-half of the combined taxable income.
The resulting tax was then multiplied by two, in order to arrive
at the total tax of both spouses. In this way, taxpayers in common
law states were given the privilege of paying the same tax on the
same income as was payable in community property states where
spouses filed separate returns.
Equalization was also substantially achieved in the estate tax
area by the repeal of the 1942 amendments and by the adoption
of the so-called "marital deduction" provisions.2" Under those
provisions, if a taxpayer dies in a common law state, his estate
is allowed a deduction for estate tax purposes of the value (not
to exceed one-half of his adjusted gross estate) of all his property
passing to the surviving spouse. However, to obtain the deduction,
the surviving spouse must receive the property outright or with a
general power of appointment so that the property will be subject
to estate tax on his or her subsequent death. By allowing an estate
tax deduction for property passing to the surviving spouse (up to
one-half of his property), a common law taxpayer could by will
leave his wife one-half of his property, with the result that his es-
tate tax would be the same as that of a taxpayer in a community
property state, where, by state law, the wife owns half of the com-
munity and therefore only one-half of the community is taxed
at death.
In the common law states the same community property principle
was extended to gift taxes. Only one-half of the value of a gift of
separate property to the wife is subject to gift tax, and in the case
of gifts to third parties, the common law citizens are now permitted
to treat gifts of separately owned property as if they were given
equally, that is, as if they were gifts of community property. In
the community property states these marital deduction and split
gift provisions are not applicable to community property but are
1
4 Revenue Act of 1948, §§ 301, 302, 303, 351, 361 and 363, amending Int. Rev. Code
of 1939, 5§ 12, 23(aa), 51(b), 811(d), (§ 811(c)(2) repealed), 812, 813 and
936(b).
" Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 812(e) as amended, Int. Rev. Code of 1954, S 2056.
19 58 ]
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applicable to separate property." Thus the community property
laws have caused basic changes to be made in the federal estate, gift
and income tax laws, and today the marital deduction and marital
deduction trust emanating from these changes have become corner-
stones in estate planning in common law and community property
states alike.
4. PARTICULAR RECEIPTS DURING MARRIAGE-WHETHER
COMMUNITY OR SEPARATE
In estate planning; in the filing of estate and gift tax returns;
in the filing of income tax returns where separate returns are filed;"'
in the administration of an estate or in preparation of a property
settlement agreement at divorce, the first consideration is to ascer-
tain those items of property or income which are community and
those which are separate.
As stated above, under Texas law, all property acquired during
marriage except that acquired by way of gift, devise or descent,
is the common property of the spouses. It follows that most receipts
during marriage and almost all items of income are community.
Thus, there falls into the community:
(a) The revenues from either spouse's separate estate, whether
that estate was owned at marriage or thereafter acquired by gift,
devise or descent. This will include rents from separately owned
real estate; dividends from separately owned stocks; interest from
separately owned bonds."
26Int. Rev. Code of 1939, SS 1000, 1004, as amended, Int. Rev. Code of 1954,
55 2513, 2523.
" While a majority of the spouses in Texas file joint returns, making the distinction
between community and separate income immaterial, separate returns are common. Where
the wife has a large separate estate and where the husband is engaged in a hazardous
operation, the parties may be well advised to file separate and not joint returns. If a
separate return is filed, the wife (and her separate estate) is liable only for tax (and
tax deficiencies) attributable to her half of the community earnings. However, if a joint
return is filed, the liability for the tax is joint and several, Int. Rev. Code of 1954,
§ 6013(d)(3), so that if a substantial deficiency should result and the husband be
unable to respond, the wife's separate estate would be liable for the entire tax. Likewise,
separate returns are used where there are net capital losses resulting from sales within
the year of community property. Since each spouse has a separate capital loss, each will
have the benefit of the $1,000 ordinary deduction (carried over for five years) under
S 1211(b) of the code; whereas, if a joint return is filed only a single $1,000 capital
loss deduction is allowed. U.S. Treas. Reg. 1.1211-1(d) (1957). Moreover, if separate
returns are filed and a deficiency asserted, one of the spouses could pay his deficiency
and sue for refund and the other refuse to pay and go into the Tax Court by way of
a 90-day letter, thus making two forums available to litigate the same question. A speedier
determination of the issue via the district court on the refund claim can thus be obtained
by paying only half of the combined deficiency.
"' As indicated above, the California and Washington rules are different.
[Vol. 12
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(b) All personal earnings of either spouse. This will include sala-
ries, wages, bonuses, pension and profit-sharing receipts, earnings
of lawyers, accountants and other self-employed. It would include
the $64,000 earned on a quiz program or a Nobel Prize Award.
(c) Gains derived from farming, ranching, storekeeping, manu-
facturing, and all similar activities, even though the capital em-
ployed be initially the separate property of either spouse.
(d) Gains from partnership operations, whether or not separate
funds are invested in the venture.
(e) All fortuitous gains; the discovery by either spouse of a
uranium mine; treasure trove; the finding of an unclaimed article
belonging to another.
(f) All awards for damages for personal injuries or torts.
(g) Earnings of minor children.
(h) Property acquired by prescription, adverse possession or on
credit after marriage.
In short, practically everything acquired by either spouse during
marriage, except that received gratuitously, is community property
under the constitution and laws of Texas; and these state rules con-
trol for all federal tax purposes. However, there are some exceptions
and important limitations, having a bearing upon estate planning
and upon federal income and federal estate taxation. These ex-
ceptions relate to certain proceeds from a spouse's separate property:
A. Capital Gains
Of course, the capital gain on the sale of a community asset is
community, but what if property owned before marriage sub-
stantially appreciates in value after marriage and is sold for a profit?
Is the gain separate or community, or is so much of the gain rep-
resenting postmarital appreciation community? An earlier decision
of the Board of Tax Appeals held that the capital gain on the sale
of personalty was a community gain under its interpretation of our
law and was, therefore, to be divided on separate returns for in-
come purposes.29 The Bureau accepted this decision for a time. How-
ever, it was clearly wrong and a later decision of the Fifth Circuit,
in the Skaggs case, corrected the error, holding that the entire
amount of capital gain, including postmarital appreciation, was the
separate gain of the spouse whose separate property was sold." The
Skaggs case undoubtedly correctly reflects the Texas law. A sale of
separate property is merely a mutation or change in the form of
the separate property. As the separate property goes up in value,
29Carter v. Commissioner, 36 B.T.A. 853 (1937).
3 Skaggs v. Commissioner, 122 F.2d 721 (5th Cir. 1941).
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it is still separate property because acquired before marriage or by
way of gift, devise or inheritance. If it is sold and a profit realized
from the increase in value, the entire proceeds of the sale are sepa-
rate because there has been simply a substitution of money for the
separate property-a change of form and not of character." Thus,
for federal tax and other purposes, profits from the sale of sepa-
rate property go to the owner of the property, and not to the
community."
B. Oil and Gas Receipts
Another exception to the general rule relates to certain income
received during marriage from oil, gas or other mineral interests
which are separately owned. It is well settled, both under Texas law
and the federal tax law, that royalties received under a lease of
separate lands are separate and not community.33 This is because
the oil in place represented by the royalty interest is owned by the
separate owner of the land and the royalty receipts are but pay-
ments for such separately owned oil, and, as in the case of a sale
of separate property, merely a substitution in form, and not a
change in character of the separate asset. It is important to note
that, for purposes of determining the ownership of the royalty re-
ceipts, the separate owner is treated as if he had sold his separate
oil; yet for federal tax purposes, these receipts are treated as ordinary
income, subject to the depletion allowance, and are not given capi-
tal gain treatment."
Similarly, bonuses received during marriage on the execution of
a lease of separate land are separate income, and not community."
This is true, whether the bonus be treated as the consideration re-
" Gleich v. Bongio, 128 Tex. 606, 99 S.W.2d 881 (1937); Rose v. Houston, 11 Tex.
324 (1854); Love v. Robertson, 7 Tex. 6 (1851); Cabell v. Menczer, 35 S.W. 206 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1896); Evans v. Purinton, 34 S.W. 350 (1896) error ref.
32 Depreciation allowed by the code should be taken by the separate owner even though
the gross income will be separately reported, half by each spouse. This is because the
depreciation is allowed as a partial return of the owner's cost, and the wife has no
investment in the separate property of the husband.
"'Texas Co. v. Parks, 247 S.W.2d 179 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952); Lessing v. Russik, 234
S.W.2d 891 (Tex. Civ. App. 1950); Bantuelle v. Bantuelle, 195 S.W.2d 686 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1946); Stephens v. Stephens, 292 S.W. 290 (Tex. Civ. App. 1927) error dism.
See also State v. Hatcher, 115 Tex. 332, 281 S.W. 192 (1926) (revenues of the state from
lease of state lands are a return of principal) ; Welder v. Commissioner, 148 F.2d 583
(5th Cir. 1945) (royalties are separate for income tax purposes); McFaddin v. Com-
missioner, 148 F.2d 570 (5th Cir. 1945) (same); Commissioner v. Wilson, 76 F.2d 766
(5th Cir. 1935) (same).
34 Harmel v. Commissioner, 287 U.S. 103 (1933).
" Welder v. Commissioner, 148 F.2d 583 (5th Cir. 1945); McFaddin v. Commissioner,
148 F.2d 570 (5th Cir. 1945); Crabb v. Commissioner, 119 F.2d 772 (5th Cir. 1941);
Commissioner v. Wilson, 76 F.2d 766 (sth Cir. 1935). Bonuses are separate although
leases are surrendered without production. Bennett v. Scofield, 170 F.2d 887 (5th Cir.
1948).
[Vol. 12
COMMUNITY PROPERTY AND TAXATION
ceived on the sale of a determinable fee under Texas property
law"s or as an advance royalty under the federal tax law.'
On the other hand, delay rentals are more in the nature of rent
and are considered, under both state and federal law, as community,
even though paid under a lease of separate lands."
Income during marriage of an operating lessee from a lease own-
ed before marriage or from a lease acquired by gift, devise or de-
scent presents a more troublesome problem. Here, the law is not
too clear. For many years, the Treasury Department has held that
income from a separately owned working interest is community
income, and not separate." Apparantly, this is the rule being fol-
lowed today for income tax purposes. The theory is that income
from a working interest, unlike royalty income, involves the ap-
plication of community efforts and skill and expenditures of monies
for operation so that the income is more nearly akin to the profit
derived from a manufacturing operation than it is to a simple re-
ceipt of money on the sale of separate property. The separate lease
is regarded as being contributed to an active business, the income
of which is community. Some support for this view is found in
several old cases dealing with the application of community effort
to separate property.4'
However, the recent decision of the Texas Supreme Court in
Norris v. Vaughan" takes the other view, at least as to leases fully
developed before marriage. In that case, gas wells had been drilled
before marriage on a separately owned lease. After marriage, little
time or effort was required to maintain or operate the wells, and
no community funds were expended in their development or op-
eration. Under these facts the Court chose to follow the rule ap-
plicable to separately owned royalties and held the income from
the gas wells to be separate. The Court viewed the production as
a piecemeal sale of the separately owned gas and relied on the capi-
"8Stephens County v. Mid-Kansas Oil & Gas Co., 113 Tex. 160, 254 S.W. 290 (1923).
"eMurphy Oil Co. v. Burnet, 287 U.S. 299 (1932).
"8Bennett v. Scofield, 170 F.2d 887 ($th Cir. 1948); Commissioner v. Wilson, 76
F.2d 766 (5th Cir. 1935); McGarraugh v. McGarraugh, 177 S.W.2d 296 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1943) error dism.
" G.C.M. 13742, XIII-2 Cum. Bull. 181 (1934).4 White v. Hugh Lynch & Co., 26 Tex. 195 (1862) (finished lumber sawed from
separate timber is community); Craxton v. Ryan, 3 Willson, Civ. Cas. Ct. App. 367
(1888) (bricks from clay extracted from separate lands are community). As stated by
the Supreme Court in De Blane v. Hugh Lynch & Co., 23 Tex. 25, 29 (1859):
If a crop is made by the labor of the wife's slaves on the wife's land, it is community
property, because the law presumes that the husband's skill or care contributed to its
production; or, that he, in some other way, contributed to the common acquisitions.
4 Norris v. Vaughan, 152 Tex. 491, 260 S.W.2d 676 (1953).
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tal gain and royalty cases above referred to." The Court also relied
on the statute (article 4613) which gives the husband management
and control over his separate property and held that reasonable
control and management is necessary "to preserve the separate es-
tate and put it to productive use;" and that in this case the pro-
duction and maintenance operations on the gas wells were necessary
to their use and preservation and in the nature of reasonable control
and management of the separate estate.
This decision changes the tax rule of G.C.M. 13742, 4  at least as
to fully developed gas leases. But it leaves the law in this area in
a state of uncertainty. Does the Court mean that only if a little
time is spent on operations is the income to remain separate, or
does it mean that whatever time or effort may be required is rea-
sonable if "necessary to preserve the separate estate and put it to
productive use;" is each case to depend on its own facts and upon
the extent of the effort expended? What is the rule if the separate
lease was a wildcat property at the time of the marriage and a dis-
covery well is drilled after marriage? What if it was only partly
developed before marriage? What if a substantial amount of com-
munity effort or of community funds went into the development?
What if the operation involved a recycling or extraction plant?
The decision leaves these questions unanswered. Where the line is
to be drawn must be worked out in future litigation.
Professor Huie suggested" that the state legislature might adopt
a mathematical rule similar to the rule in the Texas Trust Act. The
Trust Act provides, in the case of a depleting asset, that in deter-
mining what is income and what is principal as between life bene-
ficiary and remainderman, 27'2 per cent of the receipt (unless the
creator of the trust specifies otherwise) shall be deemed corpus, and
72 2 per cent shall be deemed income, distributable to the income
beneficiary. He suggests that some similar rule be adopted in these
cases and that some arbitrary percentage of postmarital receipts be
allocated to the owner of the separate mineral interest to compensate
for the exhaustion of his separate interest and the remainder of the
income be awarded to the community. Perhaps a better rule, and
one not requiring legislation, would be for the Texas Supreme
Court to adopt accepted civil law principles in this type of case. The
Court could say that where the oil operator comes into the marriage
with an oil lease and thereafter carries on an oil business, he has
41 See notes 31 and 33, supra.
"XII-2 Cum. Bull. 181 (1934).44 Hluie, supra note 1, at XLVI.
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contributed his separate lease to the community business; that the
lease and all revenues from the operation thereof become com-
munity property; and on dissolution of the marriage by death or
divorce, his separate estate is entitled to reimbursement for the
value at the time of the marriage of the contributed lease. If the
contributed lease were unproven, and of small value, the reimburse-
ment would be small; but if proven or developed, the reimbursement
would be made accordingly. This rule is based on sound civil law
principles; would be more equitable; and would be relatively easy
of administration. Whether the Court will reinstate this salutary
rule of reimbursement in this type of case remains to be seen.4
C. Corporate Distributions
A third exception to the general rule that all non-gratuitous re-
ceipts during marriage are community relates to certain corporate
distributions. Of course, ordinary dividends are community, whether
paid with respect to separate or community stock. However, a stock
dividend, representing a capitalization of surplus, is a mere pro-
liferation of the outstanding separate stock interest, and if paid
with respect to separate stock would be separate. " By the same to-
ken, stock received on a stock-split of separate stock would be sep-
arate, as would stock or securities received on a recapitalization or
other corporate reorganization.
The treatment of money or "boot" received in connection with
a reorganization is yet unsettled in Texas. Treated as additional
consideration received on the exchange, it may be held to be sepa-
rate under the capital gain and exchange case. However, it may
be viewed, as under the tax law,47 as income, if it has the effect of
a dividend paid out of the accumulated earnings of the corporation.
Considering that the community is the favored estate, the latter
should be the rule unless the amount of cash in relation to the
value of the exchanged stock is so large as to make it predom-
inantly a sale.
" See discussion of the reimbursement principle, infra. The suggested rule would also
be correlative of rules prevailing in most states, relating to trusts. If a man transfers oil
properties to a trust, with income payable to the wife and with a reversion to himself
in event of her death or their divorce, proper trust accounting would require a valuation
of the property as of the establishment of the trust. In determining distributable income,
this value (corpus) would be maintained through a cost depletion deduction so that
only the net true income would be paid the wife.
4 While no Texas case has been found so holding, the Fifth Circuit has so held,
Scofield v. Weiss, 131 F.2d 631 (1942), and this decision seems entirely sound. Cf.
Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 (1920). A persuasive analogy is found in § 296 of
the Texas Trust Act, art. 7425b-29 (1951), which provides that as between a life bene-
ficiary and the remainderman of a trust, a stock dividend received by the trust shall be
deemed corpus or principal and not income.
4 7 Cf. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 356.
19 58 ]
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
The treatment of distributions in liquidation of separately owned
stock likewise remains to be settled. If the distributions are re-
ceived in redemption of stock, whether on a complete liquidation
of the corporation or on a redemption of a stockholder's interest,
in whole or in part, the transaction, it is submitted, should be
viewed as essentially a sale; the sale cases should apply; and the
amount distributed treated as separate. Query as to the rule if there
is a proportionate distribution and redemption which is essentially
a dividend for income tax purposes.
Also unsettled is the case of extraordinary dividends; for example,
a very large dividend paid on separate stock in connection with a
corporate contraction and not in the normal course of business.
Here, the Texas Supreme Court could go either way. Since stock
is not surrendered and considering the broad statutory definition
of community property and that the community is the favored
estate, it is believed the Court should hold the distribution to be
community.""
It should be noted that under Texas law, a corporate stock which
is separate property retains its separate character, no matter how
much it increases in value as a result of corporate earnings during
marriage, and indeed, even if the corporation be charged with un-
reasonable accumulations of surplus." Thus, the corporate device
may be utilized to prevent income from separate properties going
to the community. If a spouse owning separate property desires
to avoid the effect of our community laws and to keep future
income for himself, he has but to incorporate his separate property
and impound the earnings in the corporation until such time as
his marriage has become tested and tried.
D. Limited Estates and Annuities
A final exception to the general rule governing marital receipts
relates to gifts of future income from property. Property received
by way of gift, devise or descent is separate. If a father leaves his
married daughter $100,000, that, of course, is separate. If he leaves
her $100,000 to be paid by the executors in ten equal annual in-
stallments, these payments are likewise gifts and therefore separate.
But, what if he sets up a trust with directions that out of income
or corpus the trustees shall pay her $10,000 annually, for life? What
if he leaves her the income from a property for a term of ten years?
4Cf. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, S 302.
" Under the Texas Trust Act, extraordinary dividends are treated as income and not
principal. Tex. Trust Act art. 7425b-29A (1951).
"Scofield v. Weiss, 131 F.2d 631 (5th Cir. 1942); Estate of Lucy v. Commissioner,
13 T.C. 1010 (1949).
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What if he leaves her a life estate or the income of a trust for life?
Are the receipts by her in each of these cases separate or community?
Under the civil law and under the Louisiana law, income from a
separate estate for a term of years is separate, whereas, income re-
ceived from a separate life estate is community. 1 But the Texas law
is far from settled. The Fifth Circuit in two cases has held, at least
in the absence of a contrary expression of intention by the testator
or settlor, that the income received by the life tenant or life bene-
ficiary falls into the community."2 However, the Supreme Court
of Texas in a holding during the Reconstruction era 3 and a later
Court of Civil Appeals case' have held that if the testator or settlor
clearly manifests an intention that the rents and revenues from the
life estate or equitable life estate are to be the beneficiary's sole
and separate property, this intention will control. These latter two
decisions are of doubtful validity today. The constitution and sta-
tutes define the separate and community property of the spouse.
Later Texas Supreme Court cases make it clear that the law, rather
than the intention, controls. Even the legislature may not enlarge
upon the constitutional definition of the wife's separate property."5
And the spouses by their inter vivos agreements may not change
the character of property as established by the constitution and
statutes of Texas." It should follow that the expression of an in-
tention on the part of a testator or settlor cannot do so. It is felt
that the two cases giving effect to the testator or settlor's intention
are not the law today, but that the two Fifth Circuit decisions,
holding that income from a life estate is community, are consistent
with the principles of our community property system. 7 Whether
our courts will adopt the Louisiana rule, and hold that income from
a separate estate of a term for years will be separate, remains to be
seen.
A possible solution to the life estate versus term of years problem
would be for our Supreme Court to go back to civil law principles
and re-adopt the reimbursement rule. The Court could say as to
both estates that they represent separate capital which is contributed
5 Huie, supra note 1, at XXXVII; La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 2371 (West 1952).
"Commissioner v. Porter, 148 F.2d 566 (5th Cir. 1945); Commissioner v. Terry,
69 F.2d 969 (5th Cir. 1934).
'"Hutchinson v. Mitchell, 39 Tex. 487 (1873).
'" Sullivan v. Skinner, 66 S.W. 680 (1902). See also concurring opinion of Judge Waller
in Commissioner v. Estate of Hinds, 180 F.2d 930 (5th Cir. 1950).
"Arnold v. Leonard, 114 Tex. 535, 273 S.W. 799 (1925).
"'Kellett v. Trice, 95 Tex. 160, 66 S.W. 51 (1902); Gorman v. Gause, 56 S.W.2d
855 (Tex. Civ. App. 1933).
' See Huie, supra note 1, at XXXVI.
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to the community, and hence all income received, whether for life
or for a term of years would be community, but on dissolution of
the marriage the contributor would be entitled to a reimbursement
of the commuted value of the estate at the time of its contribution
to the community."
The annuity type of case presents a different and more interesting
possibility. Assume that a spouse is bequeathed an annual sum pay-
able out of income or, if need be, out of corpus. Here, the facts
may vary. The annuity payments may, in fact, be paid all out of
income, or principally out of corpus or out of both, with no way
of saying which. Is the receipt altogether a gift or devise and, there-
fore, separate? Or, is it all community? Or, is some rule of appor-
tionment to be attempted?
In the McClelland case" the husband was given an annuity for
life to be paid out of the principal or income of a trust estate. The
court held that each annuity payment was a gift and that the
amounts received were all separate. Considerable support for this
view may be found in earlier tax decisions to the effect that annui-
ties payable out of income or corpus are gifts or devises, and not
income subject to federal income tax." Much use was made of these
decisions in the drafting of trusts involving income tax planning.
While the income tax rule was later changed,"' these income tax cases
support the view of the McClelland case that an annuity payable
out of corpus or income is itself a gift and not income from a sepa-
rate estate. Since there is a very good possibility that the McClelland
case will be followed today, consideration should be given to that
rule in estate planning. A father, desiring to protect a married
daughter, might be well advised to leave her a fixed annuity pay-
able out of income and principal.
5. SOME TRACING PROBLEMS
When a marriage is dissolved by death or divorce, it becomes im-
portant for tax and other reasons to segregate the separate prop-
erty from the community. This frequently involves tracing prob-
lems. Tracing, from an estate planning or an estate tax point of
view, may be important in various types of cases: (1) Separate
property may be sold. Under the capital gain cases referred to
"See discussion of the reimbursement principle, infra.
"McClelland v. McClelland, 37 S.W. 350 (Tex. Civ. App. 1896) error ref.
"Pardee v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 365 (1933); Burnet v. Whitehouse, 283 U.S. 148
(1931).
61Revenue Act of 1942, 55 110(a), 111(c), amending Int. Rev. Code of 1939,
55 22(b)(2), 162.
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above, the proceeds are separate. If these separate funds can be
traced into a new acquisition, such new acquisition takes on the
separate character of the purchase price. (2) Royalty or other
separate receipts may be invested in the acquisition of a new pro-
perty. (3) Separate funds, together with community funds, may
enter into a specific acquisition, in which case the new property
will be owned by both the community and separate estates in pro-
portion to funds subscribed by each estate. Thus, in the early case
of Love v. Robertson" the husband purchased a slave for $800. He
paid $330 out of his separate funds and the balance was paid out
of community funds. It was held that the slave was owned, 330/800
by the separate estate, and 470/800 by the community. (4) Com-
munity funds may be used to improve separate property, for ex-
ample, a house may be built after marriage with community funds
upon the separate lands of one of the spouses. The land remains
separate and the house becomes separate (being affixed to the free-
hold) but the community estate is entitled to be reimbursed for the
amount of the community funds expended for the benefit of the
separate estate. (5) Similarly, if separate funds are used to pay
off a debt upon community property or are otherwise expended
on behalf of the community, the separate estate will be entitled to
reimbursement from the community. "'
Tracing of separate funds into the acquisition of a particular
property may often prove difficult and, more often than not, is
impossible. Under the statute (article 4619), all effects which the
husband and wife possess at the time the marriage is dissolved are
regarded as community "unless the contrary be satisfactorily
proved." Thus, all doubts are resolved in favor of the community,
and many substantial separate estates have disappeared into the
community because of the inability to trace the separate funds into
a particular asset on hand at the dissolution of the marriage." Where
the tracing may involve a chain of sales and purchases over a long
married life, the evidence available at death or divorce necessary to
rebut the community presumption may be lacking unless careful
records are kept. But the mere keeping of records is not enough.
The person desiring to impress a separate ownership on a particular
asset has the burden of showing that specific separate funds went
into a particular acquisition. This involves the tracing of actual
627 Tex. 6 (1851).
63 Norris v. Vaughan, 152 Tex. 491, 260 S.W.2d 676, 682 (1953); Dakan v. Dakan,
125 Tex. 305, 83 S.W.2d 620 (1935); Allen v. Allen, 101 Tex. 362, 197 S.W. 528(1908); Snodgrass v. Robertson, 167 S.W.2d $34 (Tex. Civ. App. 1942).64See, e.g., Rippy v. Rippy, 49 S.W.2d 494 (1932) error ref.
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dollars. Where a spouse desires to preserve separate ownership of
specific acquisitions during marriage, he should maintain two sepa-
rate bank accounts in his name. One, his investment account, and
another, his income account. If an item of separate property is sold,
the proceeds should be deposited in his investment account. His
dividends, interest and other community items should be deposited
in the separate income account, and not mingled with the investment
funds. Royalty receipts, if separate, would go into the investment
account. Current expenses would be paid out of the income account;
and all new investments and reinvestments cleared only through
the investment account which, from the bank records and the
spouse's records, can be shown to be, at all times, exclusively sepa-
rate. Only in such a way, avoiding commingling, can he be sure
of being able to provide the necessary proof.
Mention should be made of article 4622 of the Texas statutes.
That article provides that "funds on deposit in any bank or banking
institution, whether in the name of the husband or wife, shall
be presumed to be the separate property of the party in whose
name they stand, regardless of who made the deposit. . . ." This
article was enacted primarily for the guidance of banks in receiving
and disbursing deposits; it is a rebuttable, not a conclusive pre-
sumption; it was not intended to supplant or destroy the provisions
of article 4619, that all property acquired by either husband or wife
during marriage shall be deemed community."5 Unless the presump-
tion of article 4622 is overcome by the tracing of the funds de-
posited, the deposit will be held to be the separate property of the
spouse in whose name it stands."6 However, a showing that the de-
posit was made with community funds would rebut the presump-
tion and make the deposit community. Thus, household money de-
posited in the wife's name out of the husband's earnings, or dividends
received by the wife on her separate stocks, deposited in her name,
if identified as a community item, would make the deposit com-
munity."' However, even if it is established, by tracing, that the
deposit was of community funds and thus community, the separate
claimant may still establish that it is nevertheless separate because
a gift by the other spouse of his interest was intended. This might
: Taylor v. Suloch Oil Co., 141 S.W.2d 657 (1940), error dism. judgm. cor.
66Graham Nat'l Bank v. First Nat'l Bank, 48 S.W.2d 358 (Tex. Civ. App. 1932);
Emerson-Brantingham Implement Co. v. Brothers, 194 S.W. 608 (Tex. Civ. App. 1917).
munity property in Louisiana, 30 Texas L. Rev. 157 (1952).
"'Sorenson v. City Nat'l Bank, 293 S.W. 638 (Tex. Civ. App. 1927); Rails v. Rails,
256 S.W. 688 (Tex. Civ. App. 1923); Armingen v. Martin, 252 S.W. 1109 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1923); Hightower v. Hightower, 236 S.W. 197 (Tex. Civ. App. 1921).
[Vol. 12
1958] COMMUNITY PROPERTY AND TAXATION 19
be shown by parol or other evidence, but the evdence of an intent
to make a gift should be clear in order to rebut the presumption
of article 4619 that this is community.
It may be added that the mere fact that stock, bonds or other
property stands in the wife's name, of itself, gives rise to no pre-
sumption that it is her separate property. If it appears that the
property was acquired during marriage, the opposite presumption
under article 4619 that it is community property prevails, necessi-
tating either a tracing of her separate funds into the acquisition
or a showing of a gift to her by her husband or by some one else.
6. REIMBURSEMENT
Related to but different from the problem of tracing is the civil
law principle of reimbursement. As stated at the outset, it was a
settled principle of the civil law that upon the dissolution of the
marriage, there was returned to each spouse, first to the wife and
then to the husband, the value of his or her separate capital that
was contributed to the marital partnership, following which the
balance on hand was equally divided."' This principle has been too
often overlooked by lawyers, judges and the Treasury Department.
Too much attention has been devoted to attempting to trace sepa-
rate funds into specific property acquisitions and too little has
been devoted to this important and equitable principle of reim-
bursement.
It is believed that when the marriage is dissolved, whether by
death or divorce, instead of putting a separate contributor or his
estate to the frequently impossible burden of tracing funds back
through the mutations and changes over a long married life, a
simple showing that the husband or wife came into the marriage
with separate property of a specific value should give such spouse
a reimbursement of that amount out of the commingled estate.
In Moor v. Moor,"9 the Court of Civil Appeals refused to allow
the application of this principle. And several subsequent Civil Ap-
peals cases have intimated, more by way of dictum than otherwise,
that reimbursement will not be allowed.7" Accordingly, lawyers are
assuming that reimbursement will not be allowed where identifi-
6" See Huie, Separate Ownership of Specific Property versus Restitution from Com-
munity Property in Louisiana, 30 Texas L. Rev. 157 (1952).
6Original opinion 57 S.W. 992 (Tex. Civ. App. 1900), corrected, 255 S.W. 231
(1900) error ref.
"°Edelstein v. Brown, 55 S.W. 1126 (Tex. Civ. App. 1906), aff'd on another question,
100 Tex. 403, 100 S.W. 129 (1907); Robb v. Robb, 41 S.W. 92 (Tex. Civ. App. 1897);
cf. Wagnon v. Wagnon, 16 S.W.2d 366 (Tex. Civ. App. 1929).
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cation of separate funds is lost through commingling with com-
munity funds. In several cases attempts have been made to carry
the difficult, if not impossible, burden of tracing separate funds
into specific property acquisitions, and no attempt was made to
ask for reimbursement, although that easier remedy was available. 1
It should be observed, however, that no Supreme Court case has
held that this civil law principle is not the law of Texas today, and
in the important earlier decision of the Supreme Court in Schmidt
v. Huppmann,2 the right of reimbursement was specifically recog-
nized. There, the Court said:
Where it satisfactorily appears, as in this case, that one spouse
brought into the partnership funds invested in a particular business,
which business was carried on and the profits arising therefrom used in
creating and building up the community estate, and the separate funds
are employed in the same business, at the dissolution of the partner-
ship, upon settlement with the community estate, we think the spouse
furnishing such separate funds is entitled to be reimbursed therefor.
Despite some uncertainty created by the Civil Appeals cases
referred to, it is submitted that the civil law principle of reimburse-
ment is, and should be, the law of Texas today. It is an equitable
and fair rule and relatively easy of practical administration.
The rule of reimbursement is recognized in many cases where
community funds are used for the benefit of a specific separate
property or where separate funds are used to the improvement
of or the benefit of a particular community asset." These cases, in
principle, support the proposition that if an ascertainable amount of
separate funds are contributed either to a particular community
acquisition or to the general community acquisitions, reimburse-
ment should be allowed.
If separate funds are committed to a community operation and
their identity lost, it cannot be said that the contributing spouse is
making a gift to the community unless he so intended. Usually no
donative intent is involved. Even if the spouse intended to give his
separate funds to the community, the attempt would be futile,
since under the Texas constitution and statutes, property acquired
by gift is separate and not community and the Texas Supreme Court
has held that under our law, direct gifts to the community are not
" Gibson v. Gibson, 202 S.W.2d 288 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947); Rippy v. Rippy, 49
S.W.2d 494 (Tex. Civ. App. 1932).
7273 Tex. 112, 11 S.W. 175 (1889).
73 See note 63, supra.
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possible."4 If, then, the contribution is not, and cannot be, a gift,
then it is truly an advance or loan, and reimbursement or repay-
ment should be allowed. 5
Of course, both remedies cannot be allowed at the same time.
The spouse or the executor claiming separate ownership must elect
his remedies. He must decide whether to trace separate funds into
specific, identifiable property on hand at the dissolution of the mar-
riage, or he must put in his claim for reimbursement of the funds
advanced or contributed to the marital partnership.
This principle of reimbursement may have an important bearing
on the estate tax liability on the death of a spouse, on the administra-
tion of an estate, or in the event of a divorce. It may also be used in
connection with marriage settlements. If one of the parties to the
contemplated marriage has a substantial separate estate which is
sought to be protected, recourse may be had to this remedy of re-
imbursement. In such cases it is suggested that an inventory be
prepared of all separate funds on hand at the time of the marriage,
together with the value of any such separate property. With this
inventory the spouses should agree (preferably by antenuptial agree-
ment, although a postnuptial agreement should serve), that speci-
fied properties are the separate property of the particular spouse
and that if any separate funds on hand at marriage or the proceeds
from the sale of any separate property are committed to any com-
munity business or enterprise, the contributor, upon dissolution of
the marriage by death or divorce, shall be entitled to reimbursement
of the separate sums so advanced. While the courts have frequently
stricken down postnuptial contracts which attempt to change their
property rights or to convert community property into separate,6
it is submitted that the reimbursement agreement should be recog-
nized. It does not alter the true legal rights in property, but, on the
contrary, preserves existing property rights. It simply negates any
intention that the contribution is an illegal gift and evidences the
intention that the separate contribution shall remain separate, and,
as an advance, is to be returned on dissolution of the marriage.
7
4Tittle v. Tittle, 148 Tex. 102, 220 S.W.2d 637 (1949); Kellett v. Trice, 95 Tex.
160, 66 S.W. 51 (1902).
71 See Huie's treatment of this subject, supra note 1, at § 8, and supra note 68.
"'Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 4610 (1951); Proetzell v. Schroeder, 83 Tex. 684,
19 S.W. 292 (1892); Green v. Ferguson, 62 Tex. 525 (1884); Cox v. Miller, 54 Tex.
16 (1880); Cannon v. Boutwell, 53 Tex. 626 (1880).
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7. FOOTNOTES ON ESTATE PLANNING
Perhaps more has been written on estate planning than on any
other tax subject. 7 It is unnecessary here to add to the present vol-
umes of literature on the subject except to note instances where
some modifications in orthodox estate planning techniques may
be required because of our community laws.
A. Trusts
Except for the civil law concept of community property, Texas
has adopted the common law of England as a part of its basic law.
Consequently, the Texas law recognizes trusts of all types. The
Texas Trust Act represents a codification of trust laws prevailing
in most of the common law states." In this respect the Texas law
is utterly unlike the law of Louisiana where trusts are relatively new
and given only limited recognition. The result is that normal tax
planning procedures are in use in Texas, including the use of inter
vivos, testamentary, spendthrift and marital deduction trusts.
B. Wills
Since the wife in Texas has full power of testamentary disposition
of her half of the community property, she should have a will.
The need for a will in her case is more imperative than in the case
of a wife in a common law state where she may have only an in-
choate right of dower in the marital accumulations. Should the
Texas wife die intestate, her children inherit her share of the com-
munity property and if the children be minors complications arise.
Administration of an intestate estate requires the posting of a bond
and the administration under court supervision with attendant
expense and delay. Guardianship for the minor children likewise
necessitates annual bond, annual accounting and court supervision.
Moreover, the investment powers of a guardian in Texas are ex-
tremely limited. These consequences are avoided by a will naming
an independent executor and trustee for minor children who are
directed to serve without bond or court administration.
""The articles are legion. Some of the more recent treatises are Warren & Surrey,
Federal Estate and Gift Taxation (1952); Lowndes & Kramer, Federal Estate and Gift
Taxes, Part III (1956); Shattuck and Farr, An Estate Planner's Handbook (2d ed. 1953);
Casner, Estate Planning (1956).
"SThe draftsman of a Texas trust must observe certain peculiarities in the Texas Trust
Act. For example, an inter vivos trust will be revocable unless by its terms it is made
irrevocable (art. 7425b-41). The failure to insert a clause of irrevocability will, there-
fore, produce adverse income and estate tax consequences. Also bond will be required of
an individual trustee of an inter vivos or testamentary trust unless expressly waived in
the instrument (art. 7425b-251). Again, where oil properties are held in trust 27Y2%
of the oil receipts are considered corpus and 72Y2% income unless the instrument pro-
vides for a different rule (art. 7425b-33).
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Separate wills for husband and wife are generally preferred to a
joint will."9 These will usually contain parallel provisions, each dis-
posing of only half of the community and each taking into account
the fact that the survivor is already the owner of half of the com-
munity. If the wife's half of the property is adequate for her sup-
port and maintenance, the husband leaves his half to the children.
If the wife's half may prove inadequate for her support, the testator
will leave his half in trust, with all or some part of the income pay-
able to the wife; or the trustee (other than the wife) may have
discretionary power to supplement the wife's income in order to
maintain her in the station of life to which she is accustomed. Here
the usual technique of avoiding the bunching of income and the
duplication of estate taxes is employed through the use of the
trust in which the wife has a limited life interest with remainder
over to the children."s Multiple trusts, e.g., separate trusts for each
child, are common in order to achieve the maximum income tax
saving. Special powers of appointment are frequently given to the
wife or to each child if it is desired to hedgehop another estate
tax. The usual spendthrift clauses and corpus invasion pro-
visions in case of need are commonly employed. The wife's will
contains a similar testamentary trust or trusts for the children,
with the husband either having no interest or at most an interest
in only the income or some fraction thereof, depending on the size
of the estate and his income from other sources.
In event the wife dies first, the husband is generally named the
sole independent executor and trustee in her will so that he alone,
following her death, may continue to control and manage the wife's
community interest in properties and businesses standing in his
name. If the husband dies first, his will names either the wife alone
79 From its very nature, a Texas joint will cannot take effect as a joint will while one
of the parties survives. Wyche v. Clapp, 43 Tex. 543, 548, 549 (1875); Gorman v.
Gause, 56 S.W.2d 855 (Tex. Comm. App. 1933). A joint will, on the death of one
testator, may be probated as his will, and again probated on the death of the other
testator as the will of the latter. Nye v. Bradford, 144 Tex. 618, 193 S.W.2d 165 (1946).
Until the survivor dies and the joint will is again probated the first probate does not
operate to pass the property of the survivor and the survivor may be free to remake
the will unless he is estopped by accepting benefits under the joint will as first probated.
Heller v. Heller, 233 S.W. 870 (Tex. Civ. App. 1921); Sherman v. Goodson's Heirs, 219
S.W. 839 (Tex. Civ. App. 1920); Larrabee v. Porter, 166 S.W. 395 (Tex. Civ. App.
1914). Joint wills in Texas have created some uncertainties and conflicts in the income,
estate and gift tax field. See McFarland v. Campbell, 213 F.2d 855 (5th Cir. 1954);
Masterson v. Commissioner, 141 F.2d 391 (5th Cir. 1944); Commissioner v. Masterson,
127 F.2d 252 (1942), 128 F.2d 526 (5th Cir. 1942); Scofield v. Bethea, 73 F. Supp. 31
(W.D. Tex. 1947), rev'd, 170 F.2d 934 (5th Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 336 U.S. 944
(1948). Because of these uncertainties as to tax consequences, separate wills are preferred.
"0The trust device rather than a life estate with power of sale is preferable principally
because of the greater flexibility.
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or a bank (or someone else) to act either alone or with the wife,
depending on the wife's business experience and acumen. Successor
executors and trustees are usually the same in both wills, to the end
that on the death of both spouses, whether in a common disaster
or otherwise, the same persons may act for the children in the ad-
ministration of both halves of the community estate.
Where separate property is involved, the marital deduction and
the marital deduction trust are used. Here it is to be remembered
that under the Code, the marital deduction is not applicable to com-
munity property but is applicable to the separate property of the
decedent. Aside from the tax advantage of postponing the estate
tax on half of the separate property until the surviving spouse dies,
the marital deduction serves another very useful purpose in Texas.
As pointed out above, after a long married life during which sep-
arate funds have been commingled with community funds, trac-
ing of the separate estate may become extremely difficult and
sometimes impossible. In order to avoid the expense and uncertain-
ties involved in an attempt at tracing, in order to avoid family dis-
putes and to avoid controversies with the estate tax authorities, the
testator may be well advised to devise one-half of any separate
property that he may own at death to the surviving spouse to the
end that the surviving spouse take at his death not only one-half
of the community but also one-half of any separate property of
the testator. This means that the survivor will take one-half of all
property in which the decedent may have an interest, whether the
property be community or separate, thus making tracing with its
attendant difficulties unnecessary.
Where the marital deduction is to be sought, it is recommended
that the tax formula clause, recommended by so many writers on
estate planning, be used only as a last resort. "1 Preferable is a clause
which provides, in effect, as follows: "In addition to my wife's
interest in our community property, I give, devise and bequeath
to her one-half of any separate property that I may own at the time
of my death. The properties passing to her under this clause shall
be subject to the payment of one-half of the debts outstanding
at my death, whether such debts be community or my separate debt,
and shall likewise be subject to the payment of one-half of all ex-
penses of administration, but shall be free and clear of all federal
S See Warren & Surrey, op. cit. supra note 77 at 634.
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estate and state inheritance taxes, it being my intention that all such
taxes shall be borne by my residuary estate.""
C. The Election
Under the Texas law the wife has a vested interest in half the
community. The husband at his death may not dispose of the wife's
interest except with her consent and approval. If he undertakes to
put her to an election and dispose of her community property, she
has a reasonable time after his death in which to elect to take under
or against the will. The typical election case is one where the hus-
band in his will attempts to leave the entire estate, including his
wife's interest therein, to a trustee under a testamentary trust giving
the wife all of the net income for her life with remainder at her
death to the children. If the wife should elect to take under such a
will, two tax questions arise. First, if the commuted value of her
life interest is less than the value of her half of the community,
then she will be deemed to have made a gift to the children of the
difference, which amount will be subject to gift taxes in her hands.
If she takes under the will, her entire property passes to the trustee,
and she usually will not have funds at hand to pay such taxes. In
such case either the will should make provision for the payment of
such gift taxes, or her election to take under the will should be
accompanied by an agreement with the executor and trustee that
the estate (which is secondarily liable under the gift tax statute)
will bear the gift tax. In addition, where the wife elects to take
under such a will, she is regarded by the Internal Revenue Service as
having made a transfer under section 2036 of the Code. By her
voluntary act of agreeing that her half of the community may pass
under her husband's will, she has adopted that will and since she
has a life income thereunder it is held that she has made an inter
vivos transfer of her property in trust under the terms of which she
has retained the use, enjoyment or income from her property for
her life. The result is that her estate will be subject to estate taxes
on one-half the value of the trust at her later death."3 Because of
the gift and subsequent estate tax liabilities, the election will be
8"The provision that the marital bequest be free of death duties is, of course, to
obtain the maximum marital deduction. Also, the marital deduction may take the form
of a marital deduction trust under which the wife's interest in the community, together
with half of the testator's separate estate, passes to a trustee to manage and invest with
all of the income payable to the wife for life, together with a general power of appoint-
ment in her which may be exercised by deed or by will or by will alone. In such case
she would be requested to take these benefits in lieu of her community interest.
" While there is apparently no case so holding, this is the present position of the Revenue
Service. This position seems sound, otherwise substantial property values would pass to the
second generation free of all transfer taxes.
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sparingly used except in connection with a marital deduction trust
where separate properties are added.
D. Inter Vivos Transfers
Inter vivos gifts to save income and estate taxes are also common
in Texas as an integral part of estate planning. Here again, the out-
right gift, the inter vivos trust and the multiple trusts are used.
Usually, other things being equal, the gifts will be made first out
of separate property if either spouse owns separate property. This
is because, by employing the split gift provisions, the gifts can be
treated as gifts of jointly owned property and the gift tax exemp-
tions and exclusions of both spouses utilized. At the same time, by
giving away separate property, the larger estate is reduced and the
remaining estates of the two spouses more nearly equalized, with
the maximum eventual estate tax savings.
In the case of gifts of community property it is recommended that
the wife join with her husband in making the gift. While under
Texas law the husband, as manager of the community, may make
limited gifts of community property, the gift may be set aside if it
is in fraud of the wife's rights. Her joinder in a gift removes this
question, so while her consent may not be essential, it is preferable
for tax and other reasons.
Transfers of community property in contemplation of death, or
under which income is retained or the power to alter, amend, re-
voke, or terminate is retained, are subject to the usual estate tax
rules except that usually only the decedent's half of the transferred
property is affected.
The Hinds case presents an interesting estate planning possibility.
There, the decedent in his lifetime transferred certain community
property in trust with income to his wife for her life and remainder
over. At his death, prior to the death of the wife, the Commissioner
sought to include one-half of the value of the trust in his estate
under section 811 (c) of the 1939 Code (section 2038, Internal
Revenue Code of 1954) on the ground that since under Texas law
the income payable to the wife was community, he owned half of
it and consequently he had, in effect, made a transfer in trust under
which he retained half the income for a period that did not in fact
end before his death. The Tax Court held that he had indeed re-
tained half of the income but only half from his half of the proper-
ty. Consequently, the Tax Court held that one-fourth of the trust
was to be included in his estate under section 811 (c). However, the
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding that none of the
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property was includible since he had "retained" none of the income
from the trust under that section. Whether the income payable to
the wife was separate or community was immaterial. If the income
to her were community, his half interest arose by operation of law
and not by virtue of any retention by him of such income."
So long as the Hinds case remains the law in this circuit, a hus-
band may transfer separate property in trust with income payable
to his wife for life with remainder to his children. Through the
operation of the community law, he may have half the income dur-
ing his wife's lifetime and accomplish the transfer of the property
to his children at the lower gift tax rates and without estate tax at
either his or his wife's death. Similarly, a transfer of community
property as in the Hinds case can result in the retention of income
in him for his life (if the wife outlives him as would usually be the
case) and his half passes to the children at the gift tax rather than
the estate tax cost. Of course, in such a case, the wife's half will be
exposed to estate tax at her death since she will, acting through
her husband, have made a transfer of her half, retaining life income.
8. PARTITION OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY
Community property could not be partitioned until the Texas
constitutional amendment prompted by the federal estate tax law
of 1942."5 In 1948, the constitution was amended to permit spouses
to divide all or a part of the community, provided such division was
in writing." Pursuant to the amendment, the legislature, in 1949,
added article 4624 (a) to the revised civil statutes. This new statute
permits a division, if in writing, without prejudice to pre-existing
creditors. The division agreement shall not be effective as to subse-
quent good faith purchasers, or creditors, unless filed in the county
records of the county in which the property is situated."' The statute
4Commissioner v. Hinds, 180 F.2d 930 (5th Cir. 1950). Judge Waller concurred
specially but holding that the income was the wife's separate income and not community
because the trust instrument had provided that the income was to be her separate
property. The correctness of Judge Waller's decision is open to question. See note 54,
supra, and text following. Later the Tax Court in Wier v. Commissioner, 17 T.C. 409
(1951), held that an outright gift to the wife of the homestead did not result in a gift
with retention of use and enjoyment under § 811(c), and in that case the Commissioner
agreed that an outright gift of stocks would not bring half the stocks into the de-
cedent's estate even though dividends received by the wife were community. The Wier
case was acquiesced in by the Commissioner. It may be questioned whether the acquiescence
in the outright gift type of case would mean acquiescence in a Hinds case where the
wife received income only.
"aKing v. Bruce, 145 Tex. 647, 201 S.W.2d 803 (1947); Bruce v. Permian Royalty
Co., 186 S.W.2d 686 (1945) error ref. w.o.m.
" Tex. Const. art. 16, S 15.
" Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 4624(a) (1951).
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further provides that if the exchange is other than as equal un-
divided interests in the same property or as equal shares or units
of identical personal property, the instrument of exchange shall not
be valid unless approved by the district court of the district in
which the spouses reside.
A partition of community property would not give rise to any
gift tax consequences, since, under the statute, an equal division
must be made. Nor would such a partition subject either spouse to
an income tax even though the partition may involve exchanges
of property of unlike kind."'
Under both the 1948 law and the 1954 Internal Revenue Code,
the marital deduction rights do not extend to community property,
nor to community property that has been converted by partition or
otherwise into separate property." Consequently, while a partition
may not give rise to tax liability at the same time it cannot serve
to reduce estate or gift taxes.
While no perceivable tax advantages can be obtained by a parti-
tion, the partition may occasionally be useful as an adjunct to estate
or business planning; for example, where there is a separation but
no divorce or where the spouses contemplate changing their domi-
cile to another state. It may also be useful if the husband is about
to launch on a hazardous or speculative enterprise and desires to
set aside a part of the community, free of gift tax, to his wife as
her separate property against the claims of future creditors. Of
course, a partition would not put the property beyond the reach
of existing creditors."0
9. DIVORCE AND TAXES
Divorce brings about a dissolution of the community with a
division of the common property. This division is usually evidenced
by a property settlement agreement which is generally approved by
the court as a part of the divorce decree. It must be remembered that
this division is simply an accounting to the wife of that which is
already hers and is in no sense alimony.
Where one of the spouses entered the marriage with separate
funds and there has been a commingling, the tracing and reim-
bursement rules discussed above become important in the account-
ing. In addition, several tax considerations are involved, depending
"SSee discussion of property settlements on divorce, infra.
"Int. Rev. Code 1954, §§ 2056(c)(1)(B), 2056(c)(1)(C).
" Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 4624(a) (1951).'See Hornsby v. Hornsby, 127 Tex.
474 (1936).
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on the form and terms of the settlement agreement. The agreement
may take the form of an equal division of each item of property as,
for example, an equal division of cash on hand; an assignment to
the wife of one-half of each acre of royalty; an assignment to her
of half of the shares of all stocks on hand, etc. More often the
agreement will represent an exchange of properties of like and
unlike kind. And frequently it will take the form of a cash or note
payment for the wife's half interest in all the properties or in some
of them. Then, too, one or the other of the parties may get the
better of the bargaining and, in terms of current values, receive
more than an even half of the community. What are the tax con-
sequences?
Although for a while, following the decision by the United States
Supreme Court in the Wemyss case,9 the Revenue Service sought
to impose a gift tax in some cases, the 1954 Code now makes it
clear that no gift tax will be imposed in these settlements even
though one of the spouses received more than an equal share (In-
ternal Revenue Code of 1954, section 2516). However, the in-
come tax rules were left to be worked out by the courts. The de-
cisions leave a number of questions unanswered but the following
rules would seem to apply.
If under the agreement there is an across-the-board separation
there would, of course, be no income tax problem since each spouse
would take in divided form that which he theretofore owned in
undivided form. There would be no sale or exchange and basis
would carry over.
Likewise, if the agreement takes the form of an exchange, no
gain or loss would be recognized and this would be true whether
the exchange is of like or unlike kind. While there are instances
in which a divorce settlement may result in gain," the general rule
is that the division of the community is not such an exchange of
property as to give rise to gain or loss, even though it takes the
form of an exchange of properties of unlike kind and even though
the exchange otherwise would not fall under the tax-free exchange
provisions of the Code." The division is not a commercial transac-
tion to which the exchange provisions are directed. Whether the
partition be assimilated to the liquidation of a commercial partner-
"'Commissioner v. Wemyss, 324 U.S. 303 (1944).
"Long v. Commissioner, 173 F.2d 471 (5th Cir. 1949); Johnson v. United States,
135 F.2d 125 (9th Cir. 1943).
"Osceola Heard Davenport, 12 T.C.M. 856 (1953); Ann Y. Oliver, 8 T.C.M.
403, 430 (1949); C. C. Rouse, 6 T.C. 908 (1946), aff'd, 159 F.2d 706 (5th Cir. 1947);
Frances R. Walz, 32 B.T.A. 718 (1935).
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ship or to the in-kind division of a decedent's estate or to a division
of assets among the beneficiaries of a terminated trust, the exchange
of properties whether of like or unlike kind should not be taxable."'
Thus, except for the bases questions considered below, an in-kind
division of properties creates no tax problem for either spouse.
However, we enter into an area of uncertainty where the agree-
ment calls for a cash payment to the wife in excess of her interest
in the cash on hand. Here the transaction begins to take on the
aspects of a sale rather than a property exchange. It has been held
that if "outside" cash is paid to the wife, i.e., the husband settles
with the wife with borrowed funds or notes, he has made a pur-
chase, with the result that the wife may have a taxable gain."s
This seems to be the rule now in effect-that property settlement
agreements are nontaxable unless "outside" cash or notes are in-
volved. It is open to question whether this is a correct rule. A wife
may have a taxable gain if the husband purchases the wife's proper-
ty even though he makes payment only out of his share of the cash
on hand. The essential question is whether there has been an ex-
change of properties only or whether there has been a sale of some
or all of her properties. The transaction may involve one or the
other or both, depending upon the circumstances. If the wife re-
ceives nothing but cash, whatever its source, she should be deemed
to have made a sale of all her interest. If the husband gives her
notes for her interest, she will have made a sale. If she receives cash
or notes for a particular identifiable property, the remainder of the
estate being divided in kind, she will have made a sale of that
property only and the exchange part of the agreement would be
nontaxable. More difficult is the problem where the wife receives
excess cash and a division of property, and the excess cash is not
attributable to any specific property or properties relinquished by
her. Here if the settlement agreement is predominantly an exchange
of properties and the excess cash, whether on hand or borrowed, is
simply to equalize values, and is not assignable to a particular prop-
erty which she is relinquishing, the transaction should be non-
taxable, the amount of the excess cash going to reduce her basis
in the properties received.
These possibilities of taxable gain to the wife should be con-
sidered in drafting property settlement agreements. If excess cash
"Cf. M. L. Long, 35 B.T.A. 95, 98 (1936); Marie Minor Sanborn, 33 B.T.A. 1120
(1936).
"sJesse Lee Edwards, 22 T.C. 65 (1954); C. C. Rouse, 6 T.C. 908 (1946), aff'd, 159
F.2d 706 (5th Cir. 1947). Also see Bourke, Divorce and the Third Party in Interest, 34
Texas L. Rev. 722 (1956).
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is to be paid the wife, it may be advisable to make it clear that
such excess payment is for her half interest in a certain property
or properties to be assigned to the husband, preferably to properties
having a high basis, with the rest of the settlement taking the form
of an in-kind exchange.
It has been suggested that if an unfair agreement is reached so
that the wife receives less than a full one-half of the value of the
community property, the husband may have taxable income." Pre-
sumably this would be subject to normal income and not capital
gains tax. It is submitted that this is not the rule. If the husband
has been guilty of misrepresentation the wife may set aside the
agreement and obtain a fair division. Consequently, any supposed
benefit that he may have obtained in the bargaining is subject to
an equivalent claim in favor of the wife. More importantly, set-
tlement agreements are generally reached only after considerable
bargaining in which both parties are represented by counsel. The
arm's length bargain they strike should not be subject to second
guessing on the part of the Treasury Department. In addition,
these agreements are usually approved by the divorce court as being
fair and equitable and such decrees in an adversary proceeding
are generally binding on third parties, including the Treasury. At
the least the court's finding will be presumptively correct." More-
over, the cases holding that these partitions are tax-free carry with
them the concept of no gain or loss even though one of the spouses
may have gotten the better of the bargain."
The tax basis of property following a property settlement pre-
sents difficult problems, many of which are as yet unanswered."
Before the divorce each spouse had a half interest in each property
and this half interest had a particular cost basis for gain, loss, de-
preciation and depletion purposes. If the settlement involves a
purchase and sale of all or a particular property, a gain or loss is
recognized and a new basis established as to the half purchased.
But to the extent a nontaxable exchange occurs, a shift of basis
goBourke, supra note 95, at 731.
9'7 Ann Y. Oliver, 8 T.C.M. 403, 430 (1949).
8 See'note 93, supra. It may be added that no revenue loss is involved in this rule.
Basis remains unchanged and a subsequent disposition of the divided property at a profit
will result in the same tax to the government, whether the property is sold by husband or
wife. Moreover, to assert a gain to one spouse will create an equivalent loss to the other.
99-Bourke, supra note 95. In C. C. Rouse, 6 T.C. 908 (1946), aft'd, 159 F.2d 706(5th Cir. 1947), where a sale and not a partition was held to have been made, the
price paid to the wife and not the community cost was held to be the basis. It is sub-
mitted that half of the community cost plus the price paid the wife for her half should
have been the rule. In Ann Y. Oliver, 8 T.C.M. 403, 430 (1949), where an exchange
of property occurred, the Commissioner sought to limit the basis to half of the community
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is required."' While the rules are unsettled, the following principles
seem sound: If a half interest in a particular property is exchanged
for a half interest in another identified property, the property re-
ceived would have as its basis one-half of the spouse's original cost
plus one-half of the basis in the property given in the exchange.
Thus if Blackacre is exchanged for Whiteacre, Whiteacre will have
as its new basis, one-half of its cost plus one-half of the cost of
Blackacre, and vice versa. If a hundred shares of X stock are ex-
changed for a hundred shares of Y stock, Y stock's new basis is
one-half of its cost plus one-half of the cost of X stock. This sub-
stitution of basis will apply only if there is a clear exchange of
one property for another.
Where there is no identifiable exchange of particular properties,
a reallocation of over-all basis must be made. Thus if one group
of properties is assigned to the wife and another group to the hus-
band, each group of properties will retain as a part of its basis
one-half of the cost of those particular properties. In addition, the
aggregate of one-half of the bases of properties given in exchange
will then be apportioned among the properties received in the
exchange, this apportionment to be made in relation to the then
relative values of the properties so received. Where one spouse re-
ceives more than half of the community cash on hand, the excess
would reduce the recipient's over-all basis to be so reapportioned,
and the spouse giving up cash would have an increase in his over-all
basis. Similarly, an equal division of community debts would not
affect basis. But if one spouse assumes more than one-half of the
community debts, that spouse would have an increase in over-all
basis and the spouse who is relieved of debt would have a decrease
in over-all basis, the adjustment again to be made in the bases of
all properties taken in the exchange on the basis of relative values.
Compare sections 733, 752, Internal Revenue Code of 1954.
In arriving at a property settlement agreement, the effect of the
division in terms of basis should be considered. The acceptance of
a low basis property could carry with it a tax charge on its ultimate
disposition, which charge may have a material bearing on its actual
value.
cost, contending that the husband paid nothing and did not acquire the wife's basis in the
settlement agreement. The Tax Court rejected the Commissioner's contention, noting that
the effect of the government's position when applied to all property in the partition would
be to reduce the basis of all of it by one-half and thereby prevent either party from
ever recovering the cost to the community. Apparently, the court allowed the original
community cost in absence of a showing of the basis of other property given in the
exchange.
'
05 Cf. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, S 113(a)(6); Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 1031(d).
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One final point which is often overlooked in the drafting of
settlement agreements is the matter of income taxes for the year
in which the divorce occurs. Following the divorce the spouses will
each file a separate return for the year. In these returns each must
report one-half of the community income for the period January 1
to the date of the divorce plus the taxpayer's separate income for
the balance of the year. Each spouse's liability for tax on the com-
munity income should be recognized and provided for in the agree-
ment. Provision should be made for the husband to supply the di-
vorced wife with the information necessary for her to report her
share of this community income; the agreement should be clear
as to who will pay the tax on such income as well as any deficiency
in income tax for this and prior years. If the property including
cash has been equally divided, the wife will assume all taxes on her
share. But if the agreement is that the husband will pay all income
taxes to the date of the divorce as well as all deficiencies for prior
years, it should be so stated and a formula inserted for the appor-
tionment of the current year's taxes. This would be to the effect that
the husband will pay that proportion of the wife's taxes for the
year in the ratio that her half of the community income bears to
her entire income for the year. 1' If joint returns have been filed
in prior years the spouses are jointly and severally liable for any
deficiency in tax. Consequently the settlement agreement, as between
the spouses, should provide for the sharing of any such liability and
should also provide for the sharing of any expense in connection
with contesting a deficiency. One of the spouses, usually the hus-
band, is given authority to enter into binding settlement agree-
ments with the taxing authorities. If a divorce is imminent, sep-
arate income tax returns for the year or years prior to divorce may
be preferred over the joint return.
10. SOME TAX PROBLEMS IN THE ADMINISTRATION OF A
COMMUNITY ESTATE
Our community law gives rise to some unique tax problems in
the administration of a community estate following the death of
one of the spouses. A few of these may be noted.
In Texas when a spouse dies his estate may be administered in
one of several ways. First, the survivor may qualify as community
survivor under the community survivorship statutes, which have
been recently amended. These statutes and the procedure there-
101 Bourke, supra note 95.
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under have been fully treated elsewhere and need not be reviewed
here."' If the spouse dies intestate, the surviving spouse may qualify
as administrator under the new Texas Probate Code, in which case
bond is required and administration is had under the supervision
of the court."°3 More frequently, the decedent will have left a will
naming an independent executor without bond. In such case, the
independent executor is appointed by the court at the time of the
probate of the will and, except for the filing of an inventory,
appraisement and lists of claims, he acts without court administra-
tion of any kind. The independent executor has all of the powers
of a court-supervised executor. In estate planning in Texas, one
of the first recommendations is the preparation of wills for both
spouses in each of which independent executors without bond are
named.
A. Income During Administration
When the independent executor qualifies, he acts in a two-fold
capacity. As executor it is his duty to collect the decendent's share
of the community estate; to pay the decedent's half of the com-
munity debts; to pay the decedent's federal estate tax; to collect
for the State of Texas any inheritance tax imposed on the decedent's
legatees; and to administer the residue under the decedent's will.
However, he is also under the duty to take and hold the surviving
spouse's share of the community estate and therefrom to pay the
survivor's share of all community debts and to remit the residue
to the survivor. In this latter capacity he acts as a statutory trustee
for the survivor and the survivor's creditors.
This dual capacity raises the tax question of, how is income re-
ceived by the executor during the period of administration to be
rendered for federal income taxation? Here the law is still some-
what unsettled. 04 In the Barbour case10' the Fifth Circuit held that
during the period of administration the executor as statutory trus-
tee was the owner of the surviving wife's share of the community
and consequently the surviving wife could not be taxed on a gain
derived from the executor's sale of her community property. The
case left open the question of whether the executor should file a
.. Huie, The Powers and Liability of a Qualified Community Survivor, 15 Dallas Bar
Speaks 275 (1952).
... See generally, Haddaway, Community Property in the Administration of Estates, 33
Texas L. Rev. 1012 (1955); Huie, Changes Made by the Probate Code in the Ad-
ministration of Community Property, 34 Texas L. Rev. 700 (1956); Woodward, Inde-
pendent Administration under the New Texas Probate Code, 34 Texas L. Rev. 687 (1956).
.0434 Texas L. Rev. 653 (1956).
1
°
5Barbour v. Commissioner, 89 F.2d 474 (5th Cir. 1937).
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separate fiduciary return reporting as trustee for her the income
from her 'half of the property. Later the Tax Court held that a
separate fiduciary return was not permissible."'
In 1950, the Fifth Circuit held that a surviving husband could
include in his return his share of the community income, because
the Texas administration statutes give the wife's executors less con-
trol than is given the husband's executors.'" Finally, in 1955, the
Fifth Circuit in the Sneed case,' involving a surviving wife, held
that the surviving wife was taxable during the period of administra-
tion on the income from her half of the community. However, the
decision cannot be said to settle the question since one of the three
judges dissented and each of the other two judges wrote separate
opinions, one judge wished to reverse the Barbour case and the other
to distinguish that case. In this state of uncertainty, some executors
continue to follow the Barbour decision, others the Sneed case.0 9
The Revenue Service undertakes to apply the Sneed rule.
In other community jurisdictions, the Sneed rule applies. In a
Louisiana case,"' the Fifth Circuit held the survivor chargeable on
half the income during the administration period, distinguishing
the Barbour case on the ground that the Louisiana law differed from
that of Texas. The Ninth Circuit first followed the Barbour case," 1
then qualified it,"' and finally reversed its first decision,"' so that
the Sneed rule now applies in the states of Louisiana, Washington
and California.
It is believed that the Sneed result is correct, if not its reasoning.
Since the executor in Texas is in possession of both halves of the
community property during the period of administration, he has
the primary duty of accounting to the federal authority for any
income received by him. While he acts in a two-fold capacity, that
of a statutory trustee for the survivor and representative of the
decedent, he is not administering two separate estates but undivided
interests in a single estate, with the statutory duty of collecting
all of the community and out of it paying all community debts
and then distributing half the residue to the wife and the other half,
after taxes, to the testators' legatees. In his capacity as executor,
charged with these duties as to the property in his hands, a single
"e Clara Wilson, 2 T.C.M. 946 (1943).
'Blackburn v. Commissioner, 180 F.2d 952 (5th Cir. 1950).
... Sneed v. Commissioner, 220 F.2d 313 (5th Cir. 1955).
509 See 34 Texas L. Rev. 653 (1956).
"'Henderson v. Commissioner, 155 F.2d 310 (5th Cir. 1946).
.. Commissioner v. Larson, 131 F.2d 85 (9th Cir. 1942) (Wash.).
"' Bishop v. Commissioner, 152 F.2d 389 (9th Cir. 1945) (Cal.).
'"'United States v. Merrill, 211 F.2d 297 (?th Cir. 1954).
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fiduciary return seems to be required. However, with respect to that
portion of the property representing the survivor's share, his duties
are limited. As to that half of the income, he can do three things
only-pay it currently to the survivor, in which event it would be
taxable to the survivor; or apply the income to the payment of
community debts, in which event half would be currently taxable
to the survivor since it would then be in satisfaction of the sur-
vivor's legal obligations; or accumulate it for future distribution
to the survivor. In this third case, the right to accumulate is solely
for the purpose of satisfying unpaid community obligations. No
part of the half so accumulated can be used to pay the decedent's
taxes, except with the survivor's consent. If the income is not
needed to pay debts, the executor can be forced to distribute all
income and the survivor's property as well. If the executor retains
the survivor's share of the income he must credit the survivor's
account with this amount and make eventual distribution.
Under the federal taxing statutes, income received by an executor
during the period of administration which is "property paid or
credited"' to any beneficiary is deductible by the executor on the
fiduciary return and the amount so "paid or credited" is taxable
to the beneficiary." ' Under these statutes and under the Sneed case,
it is believed that the proper procedure is for the executor to file
a single fiduciary return during the administration of the estate re-
porting all income received by him. Whether he distributes the
survivor's share or uses it to pay the survivor's share of community
debts or withholds it, crediting it to the survivor's account for
future distribution, he should take a deduction on his return for
the survivor's share and the survivor should report this full share
on his or her own income tax return.
B. Funeral and Administration Expenses
In Texas the entire amount of funeral expenses of a deceased
spouse is deducted from the decedent's half of the community
property."" However, the Tax Court has held that only one-half
of the administration expenses, including executor's, attorney's and
accounting fees, is deductible in computing the estate tax on the
decedent's share of the community."" This decision was based on
"' Int. Rev. Code of 1954, S 661 (a) (2).
..s Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 662(a) (2).
"' Blair v. Stewart, 49 F.2d 257 (5th Cir. 1931), cert. denied, 284 U.S. 658 (1931).
This is also the rule in Idaho, Estate of Lee v. Commissioner, 11 T.C. 141 (1948)
(Acq.), while in Washington only one-half is deductible, Estate of Lang v. Commissioner,
97 F.2d 867 (9th Cir. 1938); Pacific Nat'l Bank, 40 B.T.A. 128 (1939) (Acq.).
.1. Estate of Schuhmacher, 8 T.C. 453 (1947). This was also held to be the rule in
the case of an Idaho community estate, Estate of Lee, 11 T.C. 141 (1948).
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the Barbour case, supra, and on the fact that under the Texas
statutes the executor, during the period of administration, is hold-
ing both halves of the community property for the purpose of pay-
ing community debts. Accordingly, half of the expense of ad-
ministering the combined estate is deemed chargeable to the sur-
viving spouse.
These two rules are currently applied by the Revenue Service and
are generally followed by executors in the administration of com-
munity estates. The result of the second rule is that half of the
administration expenses are chargeable to the surviving spouse in
the final accounting and the surviving spouse receives a correspond-
ing non-business expense deduction on his or her income tax re-
turn.1 '8 The estate has the election of taking its half either as an
estate or as an income tax deduction."'
From a tax point of view this treatment of administration ex-
pense works to the advantage of the family. The income tax de-
duction to the surviving spouse is generally more beneficial than
the estate tax deduction since income tax rates are usually higher
than the estate tax rate. Moreover, if the survivor pays half of these
costs, the survivor's estate is correspondingly reduced, resulting in
lower estate taxes upon the survivor's death. It is undoubtedly
because of these considerations that this treatment of administration
expenses has received general acceptance. However, this treatment
is open to question and in an appropriate case the appellate court
may reach a different result. The federal district court in Louisiana
has held that since the surviving wife has a full vested interest in
her half of the community, no part of the administration expenses
is chargeable to her and accordingly all of such expenses are de-
ductible in the deceased husband's estate tax return.1 0
Perhaps a better rule would be to fairly apportion these expenses
between the estate and the surviving spouse on the basis of the
time and effort expended on behalf of each estate. The services of
the executor, the attorneys and accountants in seeing that the debts
are paid and in getting half of the community into the hands of the
surviving spouse are of benefit to the survivor's estate and some
portion of these expenses may be equitably chargeable to such sur-
vivor. But a greater part of the time and effort of the executors and
the attorneys is spent in behalf of the decedent's legatees in the
118 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, 5 212.
...Int. Rev. Code of 1954, 5 642(g); Rev. Rul. 55-524, 1955-2 Cum. Bull. 535;
Rev. Rul. 55-190, 1955-1 Cum. Bull. 275; I.T. 4048, 1951-1 Cum. Bull. 39.
1.0 Vaccaro v. United States, 55 F. Supp. 932 (E.D. La. 1944).
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probate of the will; the filing of the inventory; in obtaining ap-
praisals of the decedent's estate for tax return purposes; in the prep-
aration and filing of estate and inheritance tax returns; in con-
troversies with the taxing officials; and in the distribution of the
decedent's estate in accordance with the will. Thus in terms of time
and effort which are the basis of the fees charged, much more is
devoted to the decedent's half than the surviving spouse's half of
the community. Accordingly, it would seem that some different
allocation based on time and effort would be more equitable. In the
final accounting the surviving spouse should be charged with only
a portion of the administration expenses and the tax treatment
should follow this accounting. It may be noted that the Ninth
Circuit has held that despite the common practice in California of
generally dividing administration expenses between the two estates,
the cost of litigating the estate tax liability must be borne by the
decedent's estate and accordingly all such expenses of litigation are
deductible on the estate tax return.
C. Basis
Under section 113 (a) (5) of the 1939 Code all property passing
from a decedent receives as a basis for gain, loss, depreciation and
depletion the value of such property at the decedent's death. This
is true with respect to all of the decedent's property, even that
passing to the surviving spouse and with respect to which a marital
deduction is allowed. As a part of the equalization bill of 1948,
section 113 (a) (5) of the 1939 Code was amended so as to extend
these basis provisions to the surviving spouse's interest in community
property; this amendment was carried over into the 1954 Internal
Revenue Code."' In the recent inflationary period this statute has
been extremely beneficial to surviving spouses in the community
property states.
This statute sometimes places competing duties on the executor
of a community estate. In the interest of the decedent's residuary
legatees the executor seeks to keep the values as low as possible so
as to minimize the estate taxes; but from an income tax point of
view it may be to the surviving spouse's interest to have higher
values placed on the property in order to obtain the higher basis
for gain, loss, depreciation and depletion purposes. In dealing with
the estate tax department the tax-conscious executor must keep this
statute in mind and seek to resolve his conflicting responsibilities.
'"' Estate of Lang v. Commissioner, 97 F.2d 867 (9th Cir. 1938).
' 
2 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 1014(b)(6).
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Usually with respect to properties that are likely to be sold or to
properties of an inventory nature such as cattle or to depreciable
or depletable properties, he will accede to a higher estate tax valu-
ation, but with respect to other properties he strives to keep the
values as low as possible. As to properties that are sold following
death, the higher valuation increases the estate tax on half of the
property but the higher value produces a higher basis and a corres-
pondingly lower capital gain tax on both halves of the property.
Except in the very large estate, the capital gain tax on the two
halves is greater than the estate tax on half. And as to the inventory
on depreciable types of property, the reduction in normal income
tax on both halves is substantially greater than the estate tax on half.
D. Distributions and Partitions of a Community Estate
Following the payment of the estate and inheritance taxes, the
decedent's estate, distributable to the legatees under the will, is, be-
cause of the taxes, less than the estate distributable to the surviving
spouse. Moreover, frequently the executor, with the surviving
spouse's consent, may have used some of the survivor's funds with
which to pay the decedent's taxes and must account to the survivor
for such use. The result is that a disproportionate distribution must
be made in favor of the surviving spouse and the accounting must
be made in properties. Frequently, in the final accounting, the sur-
viving spouse may accept properties of one kind and the decedent's
legatees properties of another kind. For a time it was thought that
such distributions of properties of unlike kind involved taxable
exchanges as between the surviving spouse and the beneficiaries
under the will. However, the Tax Court has held that such in-kind
partitions and divisions are not commercial transactions to which
the exchange provisions of the taxing statutes are directed,"3 and
this decision represents the accepted policy of the Treasury De-
partment today.
Moreover, since the tax basis of the surviving spouse's interest
in the community is stepped-up at death, an exchange, though tax-
able, would generally produce no gain if the property received on
the exchange equals the basis of that given in exchange.
In the final distribution of the community estate, the possibilities
of further tax planning should be considered, taking future income
and estate taxes into account. If the decedent has left his share of
the community to the children, the surviving spouse might be well
2 3 M. L. Long, 35 B.T.A. 95, 98 (1936); cf. Marie Minor Sanborn, 33 B.T.A. 1120
(1936).
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advised to take the more conservative, low income type of property
and divide the higher yield properties among the children to the
end that the family may have a reduction in future income taxes
by spreading the larger income among several taxpayers. Likewise,
properties having enhancement possibilities could be distributed
to the children while the more conservative and less speculative
properties would be taken by the surviving spouse so as to remove
these incremental values from later estate taxation at the surviving
spouse's death.
11. LIFE INSURANCE
Many interesting problems arise in the treatment of life insur-
ance under our community laws.' The life insurance policy is a
contract between the applicant and the insurance company. Under
the contract the insurance company is obligated to pay the cash
surrender value to the insured or other owner. At death the rights
of the beneficiary become fully vested and the company is, by con-
tract, obligated to pay the proceeds to such beneficiary. The payee
may be the insured's estate, or his spouse, or a third party. Where
the policy is taken out during marriage and paid for with com-
munity funds, death or divorce may bring about competing claims
between the payee under the policy and the spouse whose funds
have entered into the purchase of the policy.
While the cases generally have regarded the insurance policies
and the avails thereof as but another species of community prop-
erty to be governed by the usual community property rules,' dicta
in some of the cases have rather suggested that life insurance is sui
juris, that policies of life insurance are not property in the com-
munity property sense, and that the life insurance laws are a gloss
upon the community laws; and that special rules of the insurance
law govern the disposition of the contract rights under the policy.""
... See Huie, Community Property Laws as Applied to Life Insurance, 17 Texas L. Rev.
121 (1939); 18 Texas L. Rev. 121 (1940).
". Kemp v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 205 F.2d 857 (5th Cir. 1953) (wife can re-
cover half of proceeds payable to husband's sisters as constructive fraud on community);
Womack v. Womack, 141 Tex. 299, 172 S.W.2d 307 (1943) (cash surrender value of
policies on divorce is community); Blackmon v. Hansen, 140 Tex. 536, 169 S.W.2d
962 (1943) (only half of proceeds of insurance bought with community funds subject
to Texas inheritance tax); Thompson v. Calvert, 301 S.W.2d 496 (Tex. Civ. App. 1957)
(one-half of cash values of life insurance on husband's life subject to inheritance tax
at wife's death); Aaron v. Aaron, 173 S.W.2d 310 (Tex. Civ. App. 1945) error ref.
w.o.m. (wife had half interest in policy proceeds payable to husband's mother in fraud
of wife's community rights); Martin v. Moran, 32 S.W. 904 (Tex. Civ. App. 1895)
(proceeds payable to husband's estate at death are community).
.. Warthan v. Haynes, -Tex.-, 288 S.W.2d 481 (1956); Sherman v. Roe, 153 Tex.
1, 262 S.W.2d 393 (1953); Volunteer State Life Ins. Co. v. Hardin, 145 Tex. 245, 197
S.W.2d 105 (1946). These later decisions, particularly the Warthan case, evidencing a
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The doubt raised by this dicta has, it is believed, been removed by
the Texas legislature in the 1957 session. There the definition of the
word "property" was amended specifically to include "life insurance
policies and the effects thereof.' 2 Thus as "property" life insurance
and the avails thereof acquired during marriage would, under our
statutes, be regarded as community property. As community prop-
erty, the usual community property rules would apply: the insured
would own the policy, not in his own right, but for and on behalf
of the community. If the husband were the insured and owner
of the policy, he possesses the incidents of ownership as manager of
the community and as to one-half of these rights acts as agent for
the wife. If the policy is surrendered the cash surrender value would
be community. If a loan is made against the policy the proceeds are
community. At divorce each spouse would be entitled to one-half
of the cash surrender value of the policy."8 If the insured's estate, as
beneficiary, collects the proceeds at death, the surviving spouse is
entitled to one-half, and only half of the proceeds is administered
as a part of the decedent's estate."' If the surviving spouse is the
beneficiary, he or she takes one-half of the proceeds as his or her
interest in the community property and the other half as a "gift
or devise" from the insured. If a third party is named beneficiary,
the usual rules relating to gifts of community property obtain. In
Texas, unlike the civil law in some jurisdictions, the husband as
manager of the community may make limited gifts of community
property. Such gifts, however, are subject to the rule that the trans-
fer must not be in fraud of the wife's community rights. Here the
rule is not an absolute one, but relative, being largely a matter of
degree and substantiality. If the gift is large in relation to the size
of the community, and particularly, if made to one not an intimate
member of the family group, the wife may, as to one-half, succeed
in having it set aside.'3' These rules would apply to gifts of life in-
surance. If the poilcy is assigned outright to a child or other third
party and is not in fraud of the wife's rights, husband and wife
degree of confusion on the part of the Texas Supreme Court, created considerable un-
certainty in this area of the law. See Stephens, Life Insurance and Community Property
in Texas-Revisited, 10 Sw. L.J. 343 (1956).
.. Vernon's Tex. Sess. Laws 1957, 55th Leg., Reg. Sess. (H.B. 900) 1228: "'Property'
includes real and personal property, and life insurance policies and the effects thereof."
(Emphasis added.) The amendment was specifically directed at the Warthan case. As to
the effect of this amendment see Swift, House Bill 900 and Your Life Insurance Policy,
Vol. 20 Texas Bar Journal No. 11 P. 691.
""Womack v. Womack, 141 Tex. 299, 172 S.W.2d 307 (1943).
.
29 Martin v. Moran, 32 S.W. 904 (Tex. Civ. App. 1895).
"O°Kemp v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 205 F.2d 857 (sth Cir. 1953); Aaron v.
Aaron, 173 S.W.2d 310 (Tex. Civ. App. 1945) error ref. w.o.m.
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each have made a gift of one-half. If a third party is named bene-
ficiary and the right to change beneficiaries is retained, the gift is
incomplete until the death of the insured, at which time the rights
of the beneficiary become vested and the spouses at that time have
completed their gift. But if either the assignment of the policy or
the beneficiary designation is in fraud of the wife's rights, she may
recover half of the policy proceeds.
The community property rules will be applied in the taxation
of life insurance. Prior to 1954, life insurance was taxed to the in-
sured if he possessed any of the incidents of ownership in the policy
or if and to the extent that he paid premiums thereon. In the 1954
Code the premium payment test was eliminated and the insured
is taxed only to the extent that he possesses any of the incidents of
ownership.'' As to policies taken out during marriage and paid for
with community funds, these incidents of ownership belong to the
community and the follwing tax rules apply. "
If the husband is the insured and nominal owner of the policy
and his wife predeceases him, one-half of the cash surrender value
will be included in the wife's estate and subject to estate tax.
If the wife is the insured and nominal owner and the husband
predeceases her, one-half of the cash surrender value will be taxed
to his estate unless it is clearly shown that he intended to make a
gift of his half interest in the policy and in the premiums to his
wife.
If at the death of the insured, the insured is the nominal owner
and his estate or surviving spouse is beneficiary, only half of the
proceeds is subject to estate tax.
If at the death of the insured, the surviving wife is both nominal
owner and beneficiary and it is shown that the insured intended to
give his wife his interest in the policy and in all premium payments,
there would be no estate tax, but the intent to make these gifts
must clearly appear. In absence of this showing, half the proceeds
will be taxed.
If the policy is assigned absolutely to a son or other third person,
husband and wife each pay gift taxes on one-half of the policy
values, and if premiums are thereafter paid with community funds,
each spouse will have made a taxable gift (to the extent that the
... Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 2042.
"' U.S. Treas. Reg. 105, § 81.26, 81.27 (1942), as amended by T.D. 5699, 1949-1
CB 181, 189 and see Lang's Estate v. Commissioner, 304 U.S. 264 (1938); Swift, note
127 supra.
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gift exceeds the annual exclusions and exemptions) of one-half of
such premiums. There would be no estate tax.
If the son or other third person is simply named beneficiary, with
the nominal ownership including the right to change beneficiaries
retained in the insured, the beneficiary's rights do not become vested
until the death of the insured, and there is no gift tax on premiums
paid because the beneficiary might be changed to the insured's estate
or some one else or the policy might be surrendered. But at the in-
sured's death, the beneficiary's rights become vested and the gift
to him, which theretofore was revocable, becomes complete. At that
time the spouses have made a complete transfer of community pro-
perty with the result that half of the policy proceeds are subject
to estate taxes in the insured's estate and the other half of the pro-
ceeds are subject to gift taxes by the surviving spouse.
If the surviving wife is named beneficiary and under one of the
settlement options the wife is paid a monthly sum for her life with
ten or twenty years guaranteed, at the husband's death only one-
half of the face value will be included in his estate, the wife having
purchased the other half with her half of the community funds,
If the wife should then die within the ten or twenty year guar-
anteed period and the unpaid balance is paid to the secondary
beneficiary named in the policy, one-half of such balance, represent-
ing the husband's half, passes to the secondary beneficiary from the
husband free of a second tax; but as to the other half passing to
the secondary beneficiary, representing the wife's share, there will
be an estate tax at her death since in the selection of this mode of
settlement the wife at her husband's death is deemed to have made
a transfer under section 2036 under which she has retained the use
and enjoyment of her half of the policy values for her own life.
The law is unsettled as to the treatment to be given a life in-
surance policy taken out before marriage and maintained after
marriage with community funds. The federal statute taxes the in-
sured if, at his death, he possesses "any of the incidents of owner-
ship." The possession of these rights as manager of the community
would not subject the husband, as manager, to tax. If the commun-
ity possesses these rights, the wife would possess half and the hus-
band half. If, however, as to a policy taken out before marriage
and- maintained thereafter with community funds, the husband
possesses the incidents of ownership in his separate, as distinguished
from his managerial, capacity, the whole would be taxed.
What, then, is the ownership, under Texas law, of a policy taken
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out before marriage and maintained thereafter with community
funds? Are the incidents of ownership in the husband in his com-
munity or separate capacity, or is the ownership divided?
There are three possibilities: (1) that the insurance policy is a con-
tract, and therefore a property right. Since it was taken out before
marriage it was, and remains, separate property. Under this view,
the proceeds would all be separate and the community estate would
be entitled to reimbursement for all premiums paid after marriage;
(2) that like the slave in Love v. Robertson, supra, the insurance
was acquired in part with separate and in part with community
funds and the ownership is split in the ratio that the funds con-
tributed by each estate bears to the total premiums paid; this was
the old Treasury rule under the premium payment test; (3) that
the insurance policy was contributed to the community partnership
and became community, with the result that all proceeds are com-
munity, subject to a reimbursement to the separate estate of the
cash surrender value of the policy as of the date of marriage.
Of the three possibilities, the second or third appears to be the
more reasonable, and of these two, our preference would be for
the third. Life insurance is an annual payment affair. It involves
an element of savings together with the element of protection. The
payment of each annual premium is necessary to continue the
yearly protection element in the contract. Each year the community,
through annual premiums, bought two things, a year's protection,
plus an increase in the cash value. It would seem that the proper
rule would be to apply the reimbursement rule; to treat the policy
as having been contributed to the marital partnership; to treat all
the proceeds as community, since these proceeds were made possible
by the payment by the community of the last year's premium;
to ignore the amount of premiums paid prior to marriage in so
far as such premarital premium payments had paid for the years
of premarital insurance protection; but to allow reimbursement
to the separate estate for the amount of the cash surrender value
of the policy (the savings element) at the date of the marriage."a'
... Apparently, the Texas law is yet unsettled and no case has decided the federal tax
question under the 1954 Code. The closest Texas case is Aaron v. Aaron, 173 S.W.2d
310 (Tex. Civ. App. 1943) error ref. w.o.m. There the husband had taken out policies
before marriage and after marriage had paid premiums out of community funds. Following
certain marital difficulties, the insured, for purposes of defrauding his wife, named his
mother beneficiary in the policies. The court held that the decedent had given his sep-
arately owned policies to the community and he had no right, by gift in fraud of the
wife's rights, to give her portion of the policies to his mother; that the policies were
community property; and that the wife was entitled to recover one-half of the proceeds.
To the same effect is Kemp v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 205 F.2d 857 (5th Cir. 1953).
In light of Tittle v. Tittle, 148 Tex. 102, 220 S.W.2d 637 (1949), it may be questioned
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12. CONSTRUCTIVE TRUSTS
Rules of constructive and resulting trusts have found their way
to a surprising degree into the Texas community property law,
although these rules are of common law rather than civil law origin.
Thus, if the wife's separate funds are used to purchase land in the
husband's name, the law will establish a resulting trust in favor
of the wife as her separate property,"' unless it be shown by the
evidence that a gift or a loan was intended. ' However, this is not
the place to discuss these interesting developments. Only one typi-
cal situation involving constructive trusts will be mentioned since
that situation occurs not infrequently in the tax practice and its
discussion will bear upon a point to be discussed later.
The situation is one in which the wife predeceases her husband,
leaving minor children and no will. The community property
stands in the husband's name, so he sees no reason to take out
administration on his wife's estate and does not qualify as com-
munity survivor, and makes no accounting to the children. Years
go by; he supports and educates his children; and he prospers and dies.
What are his chidren's rights; and what are the estate tax conse-
quences?
Here the law is clear. At the death of the wife intestate, her half
of the community property passed to her minor children. It was
the duty of the father to make a timely accounting to the children
of their share of the community estate. Having failed in this duty,
the law will construct a trust in favor of the children. It makes no
difference that the father acted innocently and in ignorance of the
law; he should have known the law and has been guilty of con-
structive, if not actual, fraud. This means that under accepted trust
principles, the children may recover either the value of the mother's
estate, with interest for its use, or they may pursue the assets in the
father's hands and recover these assets. If assets have been sold or
disposed of, they may impress a trust on the proceeds, and if these
have been used to acquire other assets, the trust follows such as-
sets. If, over a period of years, exact tracing is impossible, the chil-
dren will be able to recover one-half of the properties held by the
the father at his death, even though he may have mingled personal
whether the two decisions were right in finding a gift of the policies to the community
in the first instance. However the decisions that the proceeds were community seem
sound. Had reimbursement been allowed for the cash values at the time of the marriage,
a correct result would have been achieved and the Tittle case reconciled.
14 Evans v. Welborne, 74 Tex. 530, 12 S.W. 230 (1889); Matador Land & Cattle Co.
v. Cooper, 87 S.W. 235 (Tex. Civ. App. 1905).
.. Levy v. Williams, 50 S.W. 528 (Tex. Civ. App. 1899).
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earnings or other separate funds with the common trust fund."'
In tax parlance, we have a "family partnership" imposed by law.
The tax consequences are obvious. Only one-half of the estate on
hand at the father's death will be subject to estate tax since the chil-
dren own the other half; and the income during the trust period
is taxable one-half to the father and the other half to the children,
the proper accounting for which may involve the filing of delin-
quent returns for the children and claims for refund for the father,
in the event that he has paid income tax on the whole.'
13. EXTRA-TERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF THE TEXAS
COMMUNITY PROPERTY LAW
This topic raises problems in four different situations: (a) spouses
possessed of community property change their domicile from Texas
to a common law state; (b) spouses move into Texas from a com-
mon law state; (c) a Texas domiciliary invests funds in a common
law state; and (d) citizens of a common law state invest funds in
Texas. To what extent will Texas community property law apply
in these situations? The extent of the applicability of our law will
affect the estate of the spouses with consequential effect on estate
taxes and estate planning.
(a) If Texas citizens change their domicile to New York or
some other common law state, our answer is found in the last dis-
cussion of constructive trusts. Of course, if identifiable separate
properties are carried to the foreign state, they remain separate.
If community property is taken to the common law state, that
new state will not apply the rules of community property. Com-
munity property, as such, is foreign to that state and, as such,
will not be recognized. However, the state of the new domicile
will take notice of the laws of Texas under which the properties
were acquired and will recognize that under the Texas community
" The generally accepted trust principles summarized above have been followed in a
number of Texas cases dealing with situations of this kind. Watley v. Shoults, 137 S.W.2d
149 (Tex. Civ. App. 1940); Garcia v. Garcia, 4 S.W.2d 257 (Tex. Civ. App. 1928);
Spencer v. Pettit, 268 S.W. 779 (Tex. Civ. App. 1925), 2 S.W.2d 422 (Tex. Civ. App.
1928), 17 S.W.2d 1102 (Tex. Civ. App. 1929); Hand v. Errington, 233 S.W. 567 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1921), aff'd, 242 S.W. 722 (Tex. Comm. App. 1922); Pynes v. Pynes, 225
S.W. 777 (Tex. Civ. App. 1920); Highsaw v. Head, 202 S.W. 155 (Tex. Civ. App.
1922); 42 Tex. Jur., Trusts, 740 (1936).
... Of course, laches or limitation may have barred the children's claim, in which
event different tax consequences follow. However, laches or limitation will not start to
run until the children actually learn of, or through the exercise of reasonable diligence,
shoud have known of, the fraud. Certainly, during minority no such defense would be
available. Moreover, the facts will sometimes show that the father is not holding ad-
versely; that he has recognized their interest and has assured them he will account in due
course. Under such circumstances, laches or limitation will not apply until he begins to
hold adversely.
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property laws, the wife had a vested half interest in the properties
brought from Texas. The courts would view her as owning one-
half as a tenant in common with her husband, and as such tenant
in common she could force a partition. If the properties stand in
the husband's name, he holds the wife's half in trust for her under
a resulting or constructive trust. As the beneficiary of the trust,
the wife would have all of the rights of the children of the deceased
wife, discussed in the section on constructive trusts, supra. She could
demand an accounting and impress a trust on all properties there-
after acquired by him with her share of the common fund. If he
were to mingle his own separate earnings or properties with the
common funds held by him as trustee, she or her heirs could im-
press a trust on one-half of everything standing in his name. These
rules have been recognized in a number of cases arising in other
states and should be the rule in any common law state where the
question may arise."'5 Obviously, the estate and income tax results
of these rules can be significant.
(b) If spouses from a common law state change their domicile
to Texas, Texas will look to the law of their original domicile to
determine the character and ownership of properties brought into
Texas. If a particular property was separately owned in the foreign
state, it remains separate when brought into Texas."9 However,
once the spouses become domiciled in Texas, they subject them-
selves to the community property laws of this state and thereafter
income earned by them or by their separate properties becomes
community, in accordance with the general rules hereinabove dis-
cussed. It may be noted that, while the Texas constitution and
statutes define community property as all property acquired "after
marriage," this means only after a marriage which has become
subject to our jurisdiction by a change of domicile. Our laws do
not reach back into acquisitions made while the spouses were living
in the foreign state and change the character of such previously
acquired properties.
(c) The third problem deals with Texas citizens' investing their
funds in a foreign state. If community or separate funds are in-
vested in personal property (stocks, bonds and the like) abroad,
the law of the Texas domicile would control the ownership of such
acquisitions, under the doctrine of mobilia sequuntur personam.
.. Johnson v. Commissioner, 88 F.2d 952 (8th Cir. 1937); Phillips v. Commissioner,
9 B.T.A. 153 (1927); I.T. 1268, I-1 Cum. Bull. 234 (1922); Depas v. Mayo, 11 Mo.
314 (1848); Edwards v. Edwards, 233 Pac. 477 (Okla. 1925); Barnes v. Spencer, 79
Ore. 205, 153 Pac. 47 (1915); Restatement, Conflict of Laws, 5 292 (1934).
' Restatement, Conflict of Laws, S 293 (1934).
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If separate funds were used in the acquisition, the property acquired
would be separate; if community funds were used to purchase the
property, the property would be community. The courts would
look to the domicile of the parties and apply the community prop-
erty law of Texas in determining the ownership of such personal
property. '
If the Texas domiciliaries acquired land in a foreign state, the
ownership of the property would be determined by the law of the
situs, rather than the law of the Texas domicile. If the foreign
state is a common law state, it will not apply community property
rules as such. However, the courts in such foreign state will look
to the source of the funds used to acquire the land. If community
funds are used in the acquisition, the principles discussed under (a),
above, would apply. The foreign court would find that the pur-
chase was made with community funds; it would then look to the
Texas community property laws and find that the wife has an
equal vested intrest with the husband in these funds. Then it would
apply its own trust and property rules to the acquisition. If title
were taken in the husband's name, the court would hold, under
its own trust laws, that the husband was a resulting or constructive
trustee, holding the wife's half in trust for her.''
If a Texas husband invested his wife's separate funds in land
abroad, taking title in his own name, the foreign court, applying
its own trust rules, would regard the husband as a trustee, holding
the property for the benefit of the wife, unless it were shown that
she intended to make her husband a gift or a loan.
Up to this point, we have been discussing only the ownership
of the first acquisition abroad and, as stated, this ownership will
depend (a) upon whether the property is personalty or realty and
(b) upon the source of funds used to make the acquisition. But
what about the revenues derived abroad from the foreign invest-
ment?
If the income is derived from a foreign investment in personalty,
e.g., interest on a New York savings account, such income would
clearly be community property, because the property itself as well
as the income therefrom is personalty and governed as to ownership
by the law of the Texas domicile.
If, however, the investment is in lands in another state, and
this land produces rental income, are such rents to be governed by
141 Id. at 292.
141 Id. at 5 293. Of course, if saparate funds were used in the acquisition, the property
would be separately owned under the laws of the foreign jurisdiction.
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the laws of the situs or the laws of the domicile? If the rents are
derived from lands acquired with community funds, no problem
is presented since the rents will be equally owned under either law.
But if separate funds are invested in such realty, then the question
becomes important since if the law of the situs governs ownership,
the rents will be separately owned; whereas, if the law of the domi-
cile controls, the rents will be community, since income from sepa-
rate property under Texas law belongs to the community.
The law here is unesttled. The Fifth Circuit in the Skaggs case...
has held that under these circumstances the law of the situs con-
trols. In that case, a Texas resident owned, as separate property,
lands in California. Under the California laws, income from sepa-
rate property is separate. On the question of whether the spouses
could report the rents as community on separate tax returns, the
court held that the ownership of the rents, like the land itself,
was to be governed by the law of the situs and that the rents were
the husband's separate property under the California law.
It is respectfully submitted that the decision is wrong. While it
is undoubtedly true that as a general rule the law of the situs con-
trols the ownership of the land itself, once rentals are paid they
are no longer an interest in the land but become personalty and, as
such, should be governed by the law of the domicile. Oil in place
is real estate in Texas and elsewhere, but once it reaches the surface,
it becomes personalty and is no longer real property. So, while the
interests in the land and the interests in the lease itself may be realty,
once the rentals are received they cease to be an interest in land and
become personalty and, for purposes of determining the rights of
the wife, should be governed by the law of the domicile.
The civil law concept and the concept of our community property
law observe this difference. The land may be separate, and if ex-
changed for other lands or if sold its separate character carries over
to the property or money received on the exchange or sale; how-
ever, the rental income is not the same property; it is a different
property and being acquired during marriage, is therefore com-
munity. The Skaggs case strikes at the heart of this basic commun-
ity property concept.
The Texas Supreme Court has not passed on the question so far
as we are aware, so that the tax decision of the Fifth Circuit, in
the Skaggs case, while entitled to weight, is not the last word. If
the case were presented to the Texas Supreme Court, it is believed
142 Skaggs v. Commissioner, 122 F.2d 721 (sth Cir. 1941).
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that it would decide otherwise. Certainly, the Court would be in-
clined to follow the mandate of the Texas constitution and statutes,
that all property acquired during marriage except that acquired by
gift, devise or descent is community. These rents were not owned
before marriage nor were they acquired by gift, devise or descent,
and therefore they are not separate property. Our courts have gone
far in protecting the community and the wife's rights to income
from the separate property of the husband; the community is the
favored estate. Unless compelled by some pressing rule of comity,
Texas courts would be inclined to follow Texas law and not the law
of the situs. While it is necessary that the law of the situs control
in matters of title and devolution of title to real property within
its own jurisdiction, these reasons are not compelling when applied
to rental payments. These more often than not are paid to the owner
at the place of his domicile; they will usually be deposited in the
domiciliary state; being movables, they are under the control of
the lessor and are subject to the jurisdiction of the courts of the
domicile and should be governed by the laws of the domicile.
The Skaggs rule would permit a husband to defeat, to a large
measure, the salutary purpose of our community laws and to de-
prive the wife of her rightful interest in half of the accumulations
of the marriage by the simple expedient of investing his separate
funds in real estate abroad. It is to be hoped that when the question
arises, our Texas courts and the courts in other states will refuse
to follow the Skaggs decision and instead apply the Texas law to
rents from separate lands located in other states.
(d) This brings us to the fourth problem, that of domiciliaries
of other states investing funds in Texas. In increasing numbers,
residents of other states are investing funds in oil and other prop-
erties in Texas. There seems to be a widespread belief that such
investors, even though they retain their foreign domicile, become
subject to the Texas community property laws and that such in-
vestments create an interest in the wife of one-half of the Texas
accumulations. Under the principles outlined above, we believe
such is not the case.
If a New'York resident buys stocks or other movables with his
separate funds, Texas courts would look to the source of such funds
and apply the law of New York, since the acquired property and
the income therefrom are personalty governed by the laws of the
New York domicile. Accordingly, the investment, and the pro-
ceeds and income therefrom, all movables, would remain separate.
If he invested in oil royalties, the ownership would be governed
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by Texas law, but the Texas court would again look to the source
of the funds used to acquire the royalty, and finding this to be
separate, would hold the royalty to be separate. Income from the
royalty would, under Texas law, likewise be separate. "" If he invested
in an oil lease, the lease likewise would be separate under our law
because acquired with separate funds. To the extent that Norris v.
Vaughan'" would be applicable, the revenues from such lease would
be separate. Rents from Texas real estate should, despite the Skaggs
decision, be regarded as personalty and not as land, and their owner-
ship should be governed by the law of the domicile and not by
the law of Texas. Under New York law, the rents would belong
to the owner of the separate land. The same rule should apply to
personal earnings in Texas of a foreign domiciliary. Thus, all origi-
nal investments are separate if acquired with separate funds and all
income (even though deemed community under Texas law) would
be separate because such are personalty and governed by the law
of the foreign domicile. If income from all such sources remains
separate, reinvestments of such earnings remain separate. It would
only be by tracing separate funds of the wife into Texas holdings
that the wife obtains an interest under our law.
While the Texas Supreme Court has not finally established these
rules, it is submitted that it should, and will, do so. These rules
comport with accepted principles of conflicts of laws. Moreover,
in a broader sense, Texas community property laws should not
reach out beyond the borders of our state and apply to domiciliaries
in other states. Our marital system should extend only to our own
citizens-to spouses actually domiciled here. To extend its rules
to spouses living in other states will create confusion, uncertainties
and complexities. Under the Skaggs case, the community rules
would extend only to certain Texas accumulations and not to
others. It would not apply to the original investments in Texas
since they would remain separate if purchased with separate funds.
It would not apply to dividends, interest and other forms of in-
come from personalty since they would be governed by the law
of the foreign domicile. It would not extend to capital gain on sale
of Texas properties since under our law the proceeds remain sepa-
rate. It would not extend to oil royalties or bonuses, or perhaps
receipts from working interests since they, under our law, remain
separate. The community rules, under the Skaggs decision, would
extend only to delay rentals and rents and income from Texas
148 See note 33, supra.
144152 Tex. 491, 260 S.W.2d 676 (1953).
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real property. This, as we have stated, should not be the rule. To
hold that only this particular type of income becomes community
would extend the principles of marital partnership to one segment
only of a foreign investor's operations in Texas, whereas our system
is intended to create a marital partnership involving all marital
operations. To apply the partnership principle to one type of income
only would produce difficult tracing problems, both here and in
other states, where such income is mingled with other separate items
and the mingled fund invested in other properties, either here or
in other states. Legal complications and uncertainties of title would
result. The possible complications might operate as a deterrent to
the investment of foreign funds in Texas. It is believed that the
extension of our community rules to this segment of a foreign in-
vestor's income is undesirable and not required by any rule of comity
or any principle of conflicts of laws.' s
CONCLUSION
This review of some of the more current community property
problems arising in the tax practice shows that in a number of
areas the law is still unsettled. Such important questions as the treat-
ment of working interest income, stock dividends, reorganizations,
corporate distributions and liquidations, extraordinary dividends,
income from limited estates, annuities, reimbursements, life insurance,
and investments of Texas funds in other states and foreign funds
in Texas, are among questions yet to be resolved. The trend of the
law today is in the direction of codification. More and more, im-
portant areas of the law are reduced to statutory form. Texas has
adopted many of the uniform state laws. The Texas Trust Act
supplied an urgent need in the trust field. The legislature has re-
cently adopted the Probate Code, the Corporation Code and the
Uniform Limited Partnership Act. It would be a boon to the courts
and the bar if our community laws were codified. Such a Commun-
ity Property Code would compile and revise present statutory pro-
visions and reduce to statutory form the rules which have been
painstakingly worked out by the courts over the past hundred
145 The rule of the Skaggs case could be reduced to an absurdity. Suppose an Arab,
with four lawful wives, invests in Texas lands. If the law of the situs is to apply, how
would our community law divide the rents between the man and his four wives? Is it
not more sensible for the courts to view the rents as personalty, and allow the ownership
to be worked out in accordance with Arabic law? It may be noted that the Tenth Cir-
cuit, in Noble v. Commissioner, 138 F.2d 444 (1943), reached a result different from
the Skaggs case, but see Benjamin H. McElhinney, Jr., 17 T.C. 7 (1951), and Mamie S.
Hammonds, 38 B.T.A. 4 (1938), aff'd, 106 F.2d 420 (10th Cir. 1939).
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years. And such a code would give us the needed answer to ques-
tions yet unanswered, of which those suggested here are but a few.
A project of this kind, sponsored by the Texas State Bar, would
be a substantial contribution to the jurisprudence of our State.
